Sovereign debt and structural reforms by Müller, Andreas et al.
ADEMU WORKING PAPER SERIES 
Sovereign Debt and Structural Reforms 
Andreas MüllerŦ 
Kjetil Storeslettenŧ 
Fabrizio ZilibottiƗ 
September 2016 
WP 2016/056 
www.ademu-project.eu/publications/working-papers 
Abstract 
We construct a dynamic theory of sovereign debt and structural reforms with three interacting frictions: 
limited enforcement, limited commitment, and incomplete markets. A sovereign country in recession 
issues debt to smooth consumption and makes reforms to speed up recovery. The sovereign can renege 
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1 Introduction
Sovereign debt crises and economic reforms have been salient intertwined policy issues throughout
the Great Recession, especially in Europe. Economic theory o¤ers two simple policy prescriptions for
countries su¤ering a temporary decline in output. First, they should borrow on international markets
to smooth consumption. Second, they should undertake reforms possibly painful ones in the short
run to speed up economic recovery. However, these prescriptions run into di¢ culties in the presence
of limited enforcement issues. On the one hand, risk sharing is hampered by rising default premia. On
the other hand, a large outstanding debt can reduce the borrowers incentive to undertake economic
reforms to boost economic growth since some of the gains from growth would accrue to the lenders.
To cast light on these trade-o¤s and to derive positive and normative predictions, this paper
proposes a dynamic theory of sovereign debt that rests on four building blocks. The rst is that
sovereign debt is subject to limited enforcement, and that countries can renege on their obligations
subject to real costs as in, e.g., Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Arellano (2008) and Yue (2010). The
second building block is that whenever creditors face a credible default threat, they can make a
renegotiation o¤er to the indebted country. This approach conforms with the empirical observations
that unordered defaults are rare events, and that there is great heterogeneity in the terms at which
debt is renegotiated, as documented by Tomz and Wright (2007) and Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer
(2008). The third building block is the possibility for the government of the indebted country to make
structural policy reforms that speed up recovery from an existing recession.1 The fourth building
block is that reform e¤ort is not contractible nor can markets commit to punish the past bad behavior
of sovereign governments. This idea is captured by the notion of a Markov-perfect equilibrium, which
excludes reputational mechanisms. The interaction between limited enforcement of sovereign debt and
lack of commitment to discipline the structural reform e¤ort is the focal point of our paper.
More formally, we construct a dynamic model of an endowment economy subject to income shocks
following a two-state Markov process. A benevolent local government (henceforth, the sovereign) can
issue debt to smooth consumption. The country starts in a recession of an unknown duration. The
probability that the recession ends is endogenous, and hinges on its reform e¤ort. Debt issuance is
subject to a limited enforcement problem: the sovereign can, ex-post, repudiate its debt, based on
the publicly observable realization of a stochastic default cost. When this realization is su¢ ciently
low relative to the outstanding debt, the default threat is credible. In this case, a syndicate of
creditors makes a take-it-or-leave-it debt haircut o¤er, as in Bulow and Rogo¤ (1989). In equilibrium,
there is no outright default, but recurrent debt renegotiations. Haircuts are more frequent during
recessions, and more frequent the larger is the outstanding sovereign debt. Consumption increases
after a renegotiation, in line with the empirical evidence that economic conditions improve in the
aftermath of debt relief, as documented in Reinhart and Trebesch (2016). Thereafter, debt growth
resumes, as long as the recession continues.2
We rst characterize the competitive (Markov) equilibrium. During recessions, the sovereign issues
debt in order to smooth consumption. As debt accumulates, the probability of renegotiation increases,
1Examples of such reforms include labor and product market deregulation, and the establishment of scal capacity
that allows the government to raise tax revenue e¢ ciently (see, e.g., Ilzkovitz and Dierx 2011). While these reforms are
benecial in the long run, they entail short-run costs for citizens at large, governments or special-interest groups (see,
e.g., Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003, and Boeri 2005).
2These debt dynamics are in line with the evidence for Greece, the hardest-hit country in the Europen debt crises.
The Greek debt-GDP ratio soared from 107% in 2008 to 170% in 2011. At that point creditors had to agree to a debt
haircut implying a 53% loss on its face value. Thereafter debt started increasing again until a new crisis erupted in the
summer of 2015, culminating in the Greek governments request of a new renegotiation.
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implying a rising risk premium and consumption volatility. The reform e¤ort exhibits a non-monotonic
pattern: it is increasing with debt at low levels of debt because of the disciplining e¤ect of recession.
However, for su¢ ciently high debt levels the relationship is ipped: higher debt levels deter reforms
because most of the gains accrue to foreign lenders in the form of capital gains on the outstanding
debt. The debt overhang exacerbates the countrys inability to achieve consumption smoothing: at
high debt levels, creditors expect little reform e¤ort, are pessimistic about the economic outlook, and
request an even higher risk premium. The main results carry over to an economy in which the sovereign
can issue GDP-linked debt, i.e., securities whose payments are contingent on the stochastic realization
of the endowment.
Next, we characterize the optimal dynamic contract when the planner, contrary to investors in
the competitive equilibrium, can commit to punish the sovereign for deviations from the optimal
contract. The extent of the punishment is limited: out of equilibrium, the sovereign su¤ers the default
cost and is excluded from future contractual relations, but can resort to market nancing at the
competitive equilibrium terms. We consider two alternative cases. If the planner can observe (as
do investors in the competitive equilibrium) the reform e¤ort, the optimal contract with observable
e¤ort is qualitatively di¤erent from the Markov equilibrium: it features non-decreasing consumption
and non-increasing reform e¤ort during the recession, and overall less uctuations. Consumption and
e¤ort remain constant whenever the countrys participation and incentive constraints are not binding.
When either constraint is binding the planner increases the countrys promised utility and reduces
the required reform e¤ort. In contrast, if the planner cannot observe the reform e¤ort, the optimal
contract attains the same allocation as the market equilibrium with GDP-linked debt.
We interpret the optimal contract as the intervention of an external institution (e.g., the IMF)
that provides assistance to the economy in recession, with the commitment to quit if the country does
not implement the required reforms. During the recession, the optimal program entails a persistent
budget support through extending loans on favorable terms. When the recession ends, the sovereign
is settled with a (large) debt on market terms. A common objection to schemes implying deferred
repayment is that the country may refuse to repay when the economy recovers. In our theory, this
risks is factored in as part of the contract. Interestingly, whenever the country can credibly threaten
to default, the international institution improves the terms of the agreement for the debtor by granting
her higher consumption and a lower reform e¤ort.
To evaluate the theory quantitatively, we extend the model to a world in which deep recessions are
rare but recurrent events. In this case, for a range of low interest rates the competitive equilibrium
and the planning solution feature a stationary long-run distribution of debt. We calibrate the model
economy to match salient moments of observed debt-to-GDP ratios and default premia. The model can
match realistic debt-to-GDP ratios, as well as default premia, renegotiation frequencies, and recovery
rates. We regard this as a contribution in itself as the existing quantitative literature has di¢ culties
to sustain high debt levels in equilibrium.3
We use the calibrated model to assess the quantitative welfare e¤ects of policy interventions aimed
at mitigating frictions. The e¤ects are generally large: for instance, the assistance program outlined
above is more valuable than the outright cancellation of a debt for an economy starting from a 100%
debt-GDP ratio. On the contrary, the commitment to not renegotiate debt, with or without the
imposition of scal austerity an approach that is often portrayed in the policy debate as conducive
to better incentives is ine¢ cient as it generates costly crises along the equilibrium path.
3For example, a recent study by Collard, Habib, and Rochet (2015) estimates that OECD countries can sustain
debt-GDP ratios even in excess of 200%
2
1.1 Literature review
Our paper relates to several streams of the literature on sovereign debt. By focusing on Markov
equilibria, we abstract from reputational mechanisms, being close in the spirit to the direct-punishment
approach proposed by Bulow and Rogo¤ (1989).4 Our work is related to the more recent quantitative
models of sovereign default such as Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Arellano (2008), and Chatterjee and
Eyigungor (2012).5 This literature does not consider the e¢ cient allocation nor economic reforms.
Moreover, we pursue an analytical characterization of the properties of the model.
In terms of the moral hazard in reform e¤ort, our paper is related to Krugman (1988), Atkeson
(1991) and Jeanne (2009). Krugman (1988) constructs a static model with exogenous debt showing
that when a borrower has a large debt, productive investments might not be undertaken (the debt
overhang). Atkeson (1991) studies the optimal contract in an environment in which an innitely-
lived borrower faces a sequence of two-period lived lenders. The borrower can use funds to invest
in productive future capacity or to consume the funds. However, the lenders cannot observe the
allocation to investment or consumption. Our paper di¤ers from Atkesons in various aspects. First,
in our model we focus on Markov equilibria where the borrower cannot commit the reform e¤ort,
but the lender can observe it. This seems a plausible abstraction in the context of, for example, the
European debt crisis. Second, in the constrained optimum the planner can observe the e¤ort, but
its power to punish deviations is limited by the ability of the sovereign to revert to the competitive
(Markov) equilibrium. Third, in our theory structural reforms a¤ect the future stochastic process of
income, while his model investments only a¤ect next periods income. Finally, in our model all agents
have an innite horizon. The results are di¤erent. Atkeson (1991) shows that the optimal contract
involves capital outow from the borrower during the worst aggregate state. Our model predicts
instead that in a recession the borrower keeps accumulating debt and renegotiates it periodically.
Moreover, in our model the constrained optimal allocation (though not necessarily the competitive
equilibrium) has non-decreasing consumption when reform e¤ort is observable. Jeanne (2009) studies
an economy where the government takes a policy action that a¤ects the return to foreign investors
(e.g., the enforcement of creditors right) but this can be reversed within a time horizon that is shorter
than that at which investors must commit their resources.
Dovis (2016) studies the e¢ cient risk-sharing arrangement between international lenders and a
sovereign borrower with limited commitment and private information about domestic productivity. In
his model the constrained e¢ cient allocation can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium with
non-contingent defaultable bonds of short and long maturity. Default episodes are ex post ine¢ cient
but occur nevertheless along the (ex ante e¢ cient) equilibrium path. We focus instead on the in-
teraction between structural reforms and limited commitment in a decentralized Markov equilibrium
where international markets lack the commitment to coordinate on ex post ine¢ cient punishments.
Consequently, market outcomes are ine¢ cient relative to the allocation of a planner who can observe
(or has some information about) past reforms.
Hopenhayn and Werning (2008) study the optimal corporate debt contract between a bank and a
risk-neutral borrowing rm. As we do, they assume that the borrower has a stochastic default cost.
4The distinction between the reputation approach and the punishment approach as the two main conceptual frame-
works in the literature on sovereign debt crisis has been introduced recently by Bulow and Rogo¤ (2015).
Pioneer contributions to the analysis of debt repudiation based on reputational mechanisms such as the threat of future
exclusion from credit markets include Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Grossman and Van Huyck (1988), and Fernandez and
Rosenthal (1989).
5Other papers studying restructuring of sovereign debt include Asonuma and Trebesch (2016), Benjamin and Wright
(2009), Bolton and Jeanne (2007), Dovis (2016), Hatchondo et al. (2014), Mendoza and Yue (2012), and Yue (2010).
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Di¤erent from us, they focus on the case when this outside option is not observable to the lender and
show that this implies that default can occur in equilibrium. They do not study reform e¤ort nor do
they analyze the case of sovereign debt issued by a country in recession.
Conesa and Kehoe (2015) construct a theory predicting that the government of the borrowing
country may opt to gamble for redemption.Namely, it runs an irresponsible scal policy that sends
the economy into the default zone if the recovery does not happen soon enough. The source and the
mechanism of the crisis are di¤erent from ours. Their model is based on the framework of Cole and
Kehoe (2000) featuring multiple equilibria and sunspots.
Our paper is related also to the literature on endogenous incomplete markets due to limited en-
forcement or limited commitment. This includes Alvarez and Jermann (2000) and Kehoe and Perri
(2002). The analysis of constrained e¢ ciency is related to the literature on competitive risk sharing
contracts with limited commitment, including Thomas and Worrall (1988), Kocherlakota (1996), and
Krueger and Uhlig (2006). An application of this methodology to the optimal design of a Financial
Stability Fund is provided by Abraham, Carceles-Poveda, and Marimon (2014). In our model all debt
is held by foreign lenders. Recent papers by Broner, Martin, and Ventura (2010), Broner and Ventura
(2011), and Brutti and Sauré (2016) study the implications for the incentives to default of having
part of the government debt held by domestic residents. Song et al. (2012) and Müller et al. (2016)
focus, as we do, on Markov equilibria to study the politico-economic determination of debt in open
economies where governments are committed to honor their debt. An excellent review of the sovereign
debt literature is provided by Aguiar and Amador (2014).
From an empirical perspective, our paper is related to the ndings of Tomz and Wright (2007).
Using a dataset for the period 18202004, they nd a negative but weak relationship between economic
output in the borrowing country and default on loans from private foreign creditors. While countries
default more often during recessions, there are many cases of default in good times and many instances
in which countries have maintained debt service during times of very bad macroeconomic conditions.
They argue that these ndings are at odds with the existing theories of international debt. Our
theory is consistent with the pattern they document. In our model, due to the stochastic default
cost, countries may default during booms (though this is less likely, consistent with the data) and
can conversely fail to renegotiate their debt during very bad times. Their ndings are reinforced
by Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2008) who document that even within a relatively short period
(1998-2005) there are very large di¤erences between average investor losses across di¤erent episodes of
debt restructuring. The observation of such a large variability in outcomes is in line with our theory,
insofar as the bargaining outcome hinges on an outside option that is subject to stochastic shocks.
In particular, our calibrated economy matches the cross-sectional variance of realized haircuts, as
well as the frequency of debt restructuring. Borensztein and Panizza (2009) evaluate empirically the
costs that may result from an international sovereign default, including reputation costs, international
trade exclusion, costs to the domestic economy through the nancial system, and political costs to
the authorities. They nd that the economic costs are generally short-lived. Finally, the relationship
between consumption and renegotiations is in line with the evidence documented by Reinhart and
Trebesch (2016), as discussed above. For a thorough review of the evidence, see also Panizza et al.
(2009).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model environment. Section 3
characterizes the competitive Markov equilibrium. Section 4 solves for the optimal dynamic contract
under the assumption that the principal (e.g., a syndicate of creditors) has full commitment, whereas
the agent (i.e., the sovereign) is subject to limited commitment. A decentralized interpretation of the
optimal contract is provided. Section 5 presents quantitative positive and normative implications of
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the theory with the aid of a calibrated economy. Section 6 concludes. Two online appendixes contain,
respectively, the proofs of the main propositions and lemmas (Appendix A) and additional technical
material referred in the text (Appendix B).
2 The model environment
The model economy is a small open endowment economy populated by an innitely-lived representative
agent. The endowments follow a two-state Markov switching process, with realizations w 2 fw; wg,
where 0 < w < w. We label the two endowment states, respectively, recession and normal times.
Normal times is assumed to be an absorbing state. If the economy starts in a recession, it switches to
normal times with probability p and remains in the recession with probability 1   p. The sovereign
can implement a costly reform policy to increase the probability of a recovery. In our notation, p is
both the reform e¤ort and the probability that the recession ends. The assumption that normal times
is an absorbing state aids tractability and enables us to obtain sharp analytical results. In Section 5,
we generalize the model to the case of recurrent recessions.
The preferences of the representative agent are described by the following expected utility function:
E0
X
t

u (ct)  tIfdefault in tg  X (pt)

:
The utility function u is twice continuously di¤erentiable and satises limc!0 u(c) =  1, u0 (c) > 0,
and u00 (c) < 0. I 2 f0; 1g is an indicator switching on when the economy is in a default state and  is
a stochastic default cost assumed to be i.i.d. over time and to be drawn from the p.d.f. f () with an
associated c.d.f. F () : We assume that F () is continuously di¤erentiable everywhere, and denote
its support by @  [0; max]  R+, where max <1. The assumption that shocks are independent is
inessential, but aids tractability. X is the cost of reform, assumed to be an increasing convex function
of the probability of exiting recession, p 2 [p; p]  [0; 1]. X is assumed to be twice continuously
di¤erentiable, with the properties that X
 
p

= 0; X 0 (p) > 0 and X 00 (p) > 0. In normal times,
X = 0.
To establish a benchmark, we characterize the optimal allocation under full insurance and full
enforcement (labelled the rst-best allocation). The economy is assumed to start in a recession with
an outstanding obligation b given an implicit gross rate of return of R =  1. The rst-best allo-
cation entails perfect insurance: the country enjoys a constant stream of consumption and exerts a
constant reform e¤ort during recession (during normal times, there is no e¤ort). The level of b lowers
consumption and increases reform e¤ort in recession.
Proposition 1 Let WFB (b; w) ; cFB (b; w) and pFB (b) denote, respectively, the discounted utility,
consumption and e¤ort as a function of the outstanding obligation b, with w 2 fw; wg denoting the
initial state of productivity. Then, for an economy starting in recession:
cFB (b; w) =
(1  )w + pFB (b) w
1   (1  pFB (b))   (1  ) b;
WFB (b; w) =
u
 
cFB (b; w)

1    
X
 
pFB (b)

1   (1  pFB (b))
where pFB (b) is the reform e¤ort exerted for as long as the economy stays in recession. pFB (b) is the
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unique solution for pFB satisfying the following condition:

1   (1  pFB)
0B@ ( w   w) u0  cFB (b; w)| {z }
increase in output if econ. recovers
+ X
 
pFB
| {z }
saved e¤ort cost if econ. recovers
1CA = X 0  pFB : (1)
Moreover, when e¤ort is interior, cFB (b; w) and pFB (b) are, respectively, decreasing and increasing
functions of b.
3 Competitive equilibrium
In the competitive equilibrium, the sovereign can issue a one-period discount bond to smooth con-
sumption. The bond, b, is a claim to one unit of the next-period consumption good, which sells today
at the price Q (b; w). Bonds are purchased by a representative risk-neutral foreign creditor who has
access to an international risk-free portfolio paying the world interest rate R. For simplicity, we focus
on the case in which R = 1, although our main insights carry over to the case in which R < 1 (see
Section 5). After issuing debt, the country decides its reform e¤ort.
The key assumptions are that (i) the country cannot commit to repay its sovereign debt, and
(ii) the reform e¤ort is not contractible. At the beginning of each period, the sovereign observes
the realization of the default cost ; and decides whether to repay the debt that reaches maturity
or to announce default on all its debt. The cost  is publicly observed, and captures in a reduced
form a variety of shocks including both taste shocks (e.g., the sentiments of the public opinion about
defaulting on foreign debt) and institutional shocks (e.g., the election of a new prime minister, a new
central bank governor taking o¢ ce, the attitude of foreign governments, etc.).6 If a country defaults,
no debt is reimbursed.7
When the sovereign announces its intention to default, a syndicate of creditors can make a take-
it-or-leave-it renegotiation o¤er that we assume to be binding for all creditors. By accepting the
renegotiation o¤er, the sovereign averts the default cost. In equilibrium, a haircut is o¤ered only
if the default threat is credible, i.e., if the realization of  is su¢ ciently low to make the country
prefer default to full repayment. When they o¤er renegotiation, creditors make the debtor indi¤erent
between an outright default and the proposed haircut.
In summary, the timing is as follows: The sovereign enters the period with the pledged debt b,
observes the realization of w and , and then decides whether to announce default. If the threat is
credible, the creditors o¤er a haircut. Next, the country decides whether to accept or decline the o¤er.
Then, the sovereign issues new debt subject to the period budget constraint Qb0 = B (b; ; w)+c w,
where B (b; ; w)  b denotes the debt level after the renegotiation stage. For technical reasons we also
impose that debt is bounded, b 2 [b;~b] where b 2 ( 1; 0] and ~b = w= (R  1) is the natural borrowing
constraint in normal times. In equilibrium, these bounds will never be binding. If the country could
6Alternatively,  could be given a politico-economic interpretation, as reecting special interests of the groups in
power. For instance, the government may care about the cost of default to its constituency rather than to the population
at large. In the welfare analysis, we stick to the interpretation of a benevolent government and abstract from politico-
economic factors, although the model could be extended in this direction.
7For simplicity, we assume that  captures all costs associated with default. In an earlier version of this paper, we
assumed that the government could not issue new debt in the default period, but were allowed to start issuing bonds
already in the following period. The results are unchanged. One could even consider richer post-default dynamics, such
as prolonged or stochastic exclusion from debt markets. Since outright default does not occur in equilibrium, the details
of the post-default dynamics are immaterial.
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commit to honor its debt, it would sell bonds at the price Q = 1=R. However, due to the risk of
default or renegotiation, it sells at a discount, Q  1=R. Next, consumption is realized, and nally
the sovereign decides its reform e¤ort.
3.1 Denition of Markov equilibrium
In the characterization of the competitive equilibrium, we restrict attention to Markov-perfect equi-
libria where the set of equilibrium functions only depend on the pay-o¤ relevant state variables, b,
, and w. This rules out that the sovereigns decisions can be a¤ected by the desire to establish or
maintain a reputation.
Denition 1 A Markov-perfect equilibrium is a set of value functions fV;Wg, a threshold renegoti-
ation function , an equilibrium debt price function Q, a set of optimal decision rules fB; B;C;	g,
such that, conditional on the state vector (b; ; w) 2

[b;~b] [0; max] fw; wg

, the sovereign and
the international creditors maximize utility, and markets clear. More formally:
 The value function V satises
V (b; ; w) = max fW (b; w) ;W (0; w)  g ; (2)
where W (b; w) is the value function conditional on the debt level b being honored,
W (b; w) = max
b02[b;~b]
u
 
Q
 
b0; w
 b0 + w   b+ Z  b0; w ;
and where Z is dened as
Z
 
b0; w

= max
p2[p;p]
 X (p) +   p E V  b0; 0; w+ (1  p) E V  b0; 0; w	 ; (3)
Z
 
b0; w

= E

V
 
b0; 0; w

; (4)
and E

V
 
x; 0; w

=
R
@ V (x; ;w) dF ().
 The threshold renegotiation function  satises
 (b; w) = W (0; w) W (b; w) : (5)
 The debt price function satises the following arbitrage conditions:
Q (b; w) = Q^ (b; w) (6)
Q (b; w) = 	 (b) Q^ (b; w) + [1 	 (b)] Q^ (b; w) (7)
where Q^ (b; w) is the bond price conditional on next period being in state w,
Q^ (b; w)  1
R
(1  F ( (b; w))) + 1
R
1
b
Z (b;w)
0
b^ (;w) f () d; (8)
and where b^ (;w) is the new debt after a renegotiation given a realization . b^ is implicitly
dened by the condition W

b^ (;w) ; w

= W (0; w)  :
7
 The set of optimal decision rules comprises:
1. A take-it-or-leave-it debt renegotiation o¤er:
B (b; ; w) =

b^ (;w) if    (b; w) ;
b if  >  (b; w) :
(9)
2. An optimal debt accumulation and an associated consumption decision rule:
B (B (b; ; w) ; w) = arg max
b02[b;~b]

u
 
Q
 
b0; w
 b0 + w   B (b; ; w)+ Z  b0; w	 ; (10)
C (B (b; ; w) ; w) = Q (B (B (b; ; w) ; w) ; w)B (B (b; ; w) ; w) + w   B (b; ; w) : (11)
3. An optimal e¤ort decision rule:
	
 
b0

= arg max
p2[p;p]
 X (p) +   p E V  b0; 0; w+ (1  p) E V  b0; 0; w	 : (12)
 The equilibrium law of motion of debt is b0 = B (B (b; ; w) ; w) :
 The probability that the recession ends is p = 	 (b0).
V andW denote the sovereigns value functions. Equation (2) implies that there is renegotiation if
and only if  <  (b; w) : Since, ex-post, creditors have all the bargaining power, the discounted utility
accruing to the sovereign equals the value that she would get under outright default. Thus,
V (b; ; w) =

W (b; w) if b  b^ (;w) ;
W (0; w)   if b > b^ (;w) :
Consider, next, the equilibrium debt price function. Since creditors are risk neutral, the expected
rate of return on the sovereign debt must equal the risk-free rate of return. Then, the arbitrage
conditions (6)(7) ensure market clearing in the bond market and pin down the equilibrium bond
price in normal times and recession, respectively. The function Q^ dened in Equation (8) yields the
bond price after the state w has realized but before knowing :With probability 1 F ( (b; w)) debt
is honored, where  (b; w) denotes the threshold default shock realization such that, conditional on
the debt b; the sovereign cannot credibly threaten to default for all    (b; w). With probability
F ( (b; w)), debt is renegotiated to a level that depends on the realization of : This level is given by
b^ (;w) which, recall, denotes the renegotiated debt level that keeps the sovereign indi¤erent between
accepting the creditors o¤er and defaulting. In the rest of the paper, we use the more compact
notation EV (b; w)  E [V (b; ; w)] and EV (b0; w)  E V  b0; 0; w :
Consider, nally, the set of decision rules. (9) stipulates that creditors always extract the entire
surplus at the renegotiation stage. Equations (10)-(11) yield the optimal consumption-saving decisions
subject to a resource constraint. Equation (12) yields the optimal e¤ort decision. Note that the e¤ort
exerted depends on b0, since e¤ort is chosen after the new debt is issued.
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3.2 Existence of a Markov equilibrium
We start by establishing an intuitive property linking b^ and :
Lemma 1 Suppose a value functionW (b; w) exists and is strictly decreasing in b. Then, b^ ( (b; w) ; w) =
b: Moreover,  (b; w) is strictly increasing in b, hence, b^ (; w) =  1 () and b^ (;w) =  1 (), where
 (b)   (b; w) ; and  (b)   (b; w) :
The lemma follows from the denitions of b^ and . On the one hand, b^ (;w) is the debt level that,
conditional on , makes the debtor indi¤erent between honoring and defaulting. On the other hand,
 (b; w) is the realization of  that, conditional on b, makes the debtor indi¤erent between honoring
and defaulting.
The next proposition establishes the existence of a Markov equilibrium. The crux of the proof lies
in establishing the existence of the value function W . This is done by showing that the value function
W is a xed-point of a monotone mapping following Theorem 17.7 in Stokey and Lucas (1989). Once
the existence ofW is established, all the equilibrium functions (V;; b^; Q; Z;B; B;C;	) can be derived
from the set of denitions above.
Proposition 2 A Markov equilibrium exists, i.e., there exists a set of equilibrium functions
(V;W;; b^; Q; Z;B; B;C;	) satisfying Denition 1. The value functions V and W are continuous and
non-increasing in b. The equilibrium functions ; Q and 	 are also continuous in b: The bond revenue,
Q(b; w)b, is non-decreasing in b: The policy function B (b; w) is non-decreasing in b.
Proposition 2 establishes the existence but not the uniqueness of the Markov equilibrium. The
corollary of Theorem 17.7 in Stokey and Lucas (1989) provides a strategy to verify numerically whether
an equilibrium is unique. We state this as Corollary 1 in Appendix A.
The next proposition establishes local di¤erentiability properties of the value functionW , and that
the rst-order conditions are necessary. Due to the possibility that debt is renegotiated, the value
functions are not necessarily concave. In spite of this, we can establish that the equilibrium functions
are di¤erentiable at all debt levels that can be the result of an optimal choice given some initial debt
level. We dene formally the set of such debt levels as B(w) = fx 2 [b;~b] j B (B (b; ; w) ; w) = x; for
b 2 [b;~b]g.8
Proposition 3 The equilibrium functions W (b; w), Z(b; w); (b; w), Q(b; w), 	(b) are di¤erentiable
for all b 2 B(w). Moreover, for any b0 2 B(w); the rst-order condition (@=@b0)u (Q(b0; w)b0 + w   b)+
(@=@b0)Z (b0; w) = 0 and the envelope condition @W (b0; w)=@b0 =  u0 (C (b0; w)) holds true.
The proof follows from the envelope theorem of Clausen and Strub (2013) that applies to problems
including endogenous functions such as default probabilities and interest rates (see also Arellano et
al. 2014).
Hereafter, for simplicity, we refer to the competitive Markov equilibrium as the competitive equi-
librium.
8We prove later that during normal times the equilibrium functions are di¤erentiable everywhere. However, this is
not true in recession. In this case Proposition 3 shows that di¤erentiability still holds for all b that can be attained as
an optimal choice.
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3.3 Competitive equilibrium in normal times
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium when the economy is in normal times. The next lemma
establishes properties of the debt revenue function at the optimal interior debt choice.
Lemma 2 The debt revenue function Q(b0; w)b0 is concave in b0 2 [b;~b] and di¤erentiable for all
b0 2 B(w) where @ (Q (b0; w) b0) =@b0 = R 1 (1  F ( (b0; w))).
An immediate implication of the lemma is that if we dene b to be the lowest debt inducing
renegotiation almost surely (i.e., such that limb0!b F ((b0; w)) = 1), then, b is also the top of the
La¤er curve, i.e., the endogenous debt limit. More formally, b  min
n
arg maxb2[b;~b] fQ (b; w) bg
o
< ~b:
Although the borrower could issue debt exceeding b, the marginal debt revenue would be zero for
b0 > b since this debt would never be honored.
We now characterize the consumption and debt dynamics. We introduce a denition that will be
useful throughout the paper.
Denition 2 A Conditional Euler Equation (CEE) describes the (expected) marginal rate of substi-
tution between current and next-period consumption in all states of nature 0 that induce the sovereign
to honor its debt next period.
Next, we characterize formally the CEE. The sovereign solves the consumption-saving problem
given by (10). The rst-order condition and the envelope theorem yield the following result.
Proposition 4 If the realization of 0 induces no renegotiation, then the following CEE holds true:
R
u0 (c0jH; w)
u0 (c)
= 1; (13)
where c = C (B (b; ; w) ; w) is current consumption and c0jH; w = C (b0; w) = C (B (B (b; ; w) ; w) ; w)
is next-period consumption conditional on no renegotiation. Since R = 1; then b0 = B (b; w) = b,
and consumption remains constant. Moreover, for all b < b, the value function W (b; w) is strictly
decreasing, strictly concave and twice continuously di¤erentiable in b, and consumption C(b; w) is
strictly falling in b.
Although the CEE (13) resembles a standard Euler Equation under full commitment, the similarity
is deceiving: R is not the realized interest rate when debt is fully honored; this in fact higher due to
the default premium.
When debt is renegotiated, consumption increases discretely, hence u0 (ct) =u0 (ct+1) > R. This is
not surprising, since the country benets from a reduction in debt repayment.9 Thus, consumption
and debt are, respectively, increasing and decreasing step functions over time: they remain constant
9The prediction that whenever debt is renegotiated consumption increases permanently is extreme, and hinges on the
assumptions that R = 1 and that  is i.i.d. with a known distribution. In Section B.3 of Appendix B we extend the
model to a setting where there is uncertainty about the true distribution of  and the market learns about this distribution
by observing the sequence of s. In this case, a low realization of  has two opposing e¤ects on consumption: on the
one hand, a low  triggers debt renegotiation which on its own would increase consumption; on the other hand, a low 
a¤ects the beliefs about the distribution of , inducing the market to regard the country as less creditworthy (namely,
the country draws from a distribution where low  is more likely). This tends to increase the default premium on bonds
and to lower consumption.
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Figure 1: Simulation of debt and consumption for a particular sequence of s during normal times.
in every period in which the country honors its debt, while changing discretely upon every episode
of renegotiation. Figure 1 illustrates a simulation of the consumption and debt dynamics. Note that
the sequence of renegotiations eventually brings the debt to a su¢ ciently low level where the risk
of renegotiation vanishes. This consumption path is di¤erent from the rst-best allocation where
consumption and debt are constant for ever. Interestingly, in the long run, consumption is higher in
the competitive equilibrium with the risk of repudiation than in the rst best allocation.
It is straightforward to generalize the results to the case of R < 1 under the assumption that
utility features constant relative risk aversion. In this case, when the debt is honored debt would
increase and consumption would fall. After each episode of renegotiation the economy would start
again accumulating debt. In a world comprising economies with di¤erent ; e.g., some with R = 1
and some with R < 1; economies with low  would experience recurrent debt crises.
3.4 Equilibrium under recession
When the economy is in recession the sovereign chooses, sequentially, whether to honor the current
debt, how much new debt to issue, and how much reform e¤ort to exert. In this section, we assume
that the sovereign cannot issue GDP-linked debt, i.e., securities whose payment is contingent on the
stochastic realization of the endowment. In Section 3.5 below we relax this restriction.
A natural property of the competitive equilibrium is that C (b; w) < C (b; w) for all b  b: con-
ditional on honoring a giving debt level, consumption is higher in normal times than in a recession.
Although we could nd no numerical counterexample to this property, it is di¢ cult to prove it in
general because the equilibrium functions for consumption, e¤ort and debt price are determined si-
multaneously. However, we can provide a su¢ cient condition.
Proposition 5 The following conditions are su¢ cient to ensure that C (b; w) < C (b; w) for all b 2
0;b

: (i) w   w > 1  w; and (ii) F [(u ( w)  u ((1  ) ( w   w))) = (1  )] = 0.
When C (b; w) < C (b; w), it is straightforward to show, using Denition 1, that (b; w) > (b; w),
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b^(;w) < b^(; w), Q(b; w) < Q(b; w) and W (b; w) < W (b; w): Note, in particular, that the price
of the bond increases if the recession ends because of the associated reduction in the probability of
renegotiation. The property that (b; w) > (b; w) implies that one can partition the state space into
three regions:
- if b < b ; the country honors the debt with a positive probability, irrespective of the aggregate
state (the probability of renegotiation being higher if the recession continues than if it ends);10
- if b 2 b ;b ; the country renegotiates with probability one if the recession continues, while it
honors the debt with a positive probability if the recession ends;
- if b > b; the country renegotiates its debt with probability one, irrespective of the aggregate
state.
Note that the risk of repudiation introduces some state contingency, since debt is repaid with
di¤erent probabilities under recession and normal times.
3.4.1 Reform e¤ort in equilibrium
We denote by 	 (b0) the equilibrium policy function for e¤ort, i.e., the probability that the recession
ends next period, as a function of the newly-issued debt. More formally, the rst-order condition from
(12) yields:11
X 0
 
	
 
b0

= 
Z 1
0
V
 
b0; 0; w

dF () 
Z 1
0
V
 
b0; 0; w

dF ()

: (14)
The sovereigns incentive to exert reform e¤ort hinges on the increase in expected utility associated
with the end of the recession. However, e¤ort is not provided e¢ ciently. To see why, recall that the
bond price increases upon economic recovery. Thus, the creditors reap part of the welfare gain from
economic recovery, whereas the country bears the full burden of the e¤ort cost.
We can prove that e¤ort is ine¢ ciently provided with the aid of a simple one-period deviation
argument. Consider an equilibrium e¤ort choice path consistent with (14) corresponding to the case
of non-contractible e¤ort. Next, suppose that, only in the initial period, the country could contract
e¤ort before issuing new debt. The following lemma shows that, in this case, the country would choose
a higher reform e¤ort than in the competitive equilibrium.
Lemma 3 Suppose that b0 > 0 and that the borrower can, in the initial period, commit to an e¤ort
level upon issuing new debt. Then, the reform e¤ort would be strictly larger than in the case in which
e¤ort is never contractible.
If the sovereign could commit to reform, its e¤ort would be monotonically increasing in the debt
level, since a high debt increases the hardship of a recession. However, in equilibrium reform e¤ort
exhibits a non-monotonic behavior. More precisely, 	 (b) is increasing at low levels of debt, and
decreasing in a range of high debt levels, including the entire region

b ;b

. Proposition 6 establishes
this result more formally.
10b  is implicitly determined by the equation W
 
b ; w

= W (0; w)  max.
11Nota that the continuity and monotonicity of X; together with the continuity of the value functions ensure that 	
is a continuous function.
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Proposition 6 There exist three ranges, [0; b1]  [0; b ]; [b2;b]  [b ;b]; and

b;1 such that:
1. If b 2 [0; b1) ; 	0 (b) > 0;
2. If b 2  b2;b ; 	0 (b) < 0;
3. If b 2 b;1 ; 	0 (b) = 0.
The following argument establishes the result. Consider a low (possibly negative) debt range
where the probability of renegotiation is zero. In this range, there is no moral hazard. Thus, a higher
debt level has a disciplining e¤ect, i.e., it strengthens the incentive for economic reforms: due to the
concavity of the utility function, the discounted gain of leaving the recession is an increasing function
of debt.
As one moves to a larger initial debt, however, moral hazard becomes more severe, since the reform
e¤ort decreases the probability of default, and shifts some of the gains to the creditors. The e¤ect
of debt overhang (cf. Krugman 1988) dominates over the disciplining e¤ect in the region [b ;b]. In
this range, debt has a stark state contingency. If the economy remains in recession, it is renegotiated
for sure, rendering the continuation utility independent of b. If the recession ends, the continuation
utility is decreasing in b. Therefore, in this region the value of reform e¤ort necessarily decreases in b.
By continuity, the same argument applies to a range of debt below b .12
The debt-overhang e¤ect hinges on the presence of some renegotiation risk and an associated
premium on debt. If the borrower instead could commit to repay the debt, the price of debt would
be 1=R, so an economic recovery would not yield any benets to the lenders and the e¤ort function
would be monotone increasing in debt.
3.4.2 Debt issuance and consumption dynamics
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium dynamics of consumption and debt. We proceed in
two steps. First, we derive the properties of the CEE. Then, we summarize its characterization in a
formal proposition.
The rst-order condition of (10) together with the envelope theorem yields the following CEE:
E

MUt+1
MUt
jdebt is honored at t+ 1

(15)
= 1 +
	0 (bt+1)
Pr (debt is honored at t+ 1)
R
h
Q (bt+1; w)  Q^ (bt+1; w)
i
bt+1:
Equation (15) di¤ers from (13) in two terms. First, the left-hand side has the expected ratio
between the marginal utilities, due to the uncertainty about the future aggregate state. Second, there
is a new term on the right-hand side capturing the e¤ect of debt on reform e¤ort.
For expositional purposes, consider rst the case in which the probability that the recession ends is
exogenous, i.e., 	0 = 0. In this case, the CEE requires that the expected marginal utility be constant.
For this to be true, consumption growth must be positive if the recession ends and negative if it
continues. The lack of consumption insurance stems from the incompleteness of nancial markets,
12 In a variety of numerical simulations, we have always found 	 to be hump-shaped with a unique peak (see Figure
3), although in general this depends on the distribution F ().
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and would disappear if the sovereign could issue GDP-linked debt. In Section 3.5 below, we show that
this conclusion does not carry over to the economy with moral hazard.
Consider, next, the general case. Moral hazard introduces a new strategic motive since the level of
newly-issued debt a¤ects the sovereigns ex-post incentive to make reforms. The sign of this strategic
e¤ect hinges on the sign of 	0 (see Proposition 6). When the outstanding debt is low, 	0 > 0: Then,
more debt strengthens the ex-post incentive to reform, thereby increasing the price of the newly-
issued debt. The right-hand side of (15) is in this case larger than unity, and the CEE implies a lower
consumption fall (hence, higher debt accumulation) than in the absence of moral hazard. In contrast,
in the region of high initial debt, 	0 < 0. In this case, the sovereign issues less debt than in the absence
of moral hazard in order to mitigate the fall in debt price associated with moral hazard. Thus, when
the recession continues, a highly indebted country will obtain less consumption insurance when the
reform is endogenous than when p is exogenous.
We summarize the results in a formal proposition.
Proposition 7 If the economy starts in a recession and the realization of 0 induces no renegotia-
tion, the optimal debt level, b0 = B (B (b; ; w) ; w) ; induces a consumption sequence that satises the
following CEE:
R
0BBBBBBBBBBBB@

1 	  b0  1  F    b0| {z }
prob. of repayment and continuing recession
Pr
 
Hjb0| {z }
unconditional prob. of repayment
 u
0  c0jH;w
u (c)| {z }
MRS if rec. cont.
+
	
 
b0
  1  F    b0| {z }
prob. of repayment and end of recession
Pr
 
Hjb0| {z }
unconditional prob. of repayment
 u
0 (c0jH; w)
u (c)| {z }
MRS if rec. ends
1CCCCCCCCCCCCA
= 1+
	0 (b0)
Pr (Hjb0)R

Q
 
b0; w
  Q^  b0; w b0| {z }
gain to lenders if recession ends
(16)
where c = C (B (b; ; w) ; w) is current consumption, c0jH;w = C (b0; w) = C (B (B (b; ; w) ; w) ; w) is
next-period consumption conditional on w and no renegotiation, and Pr (Hjb0) is the unconditional
probability that the debt b0 be honored, i.e., Pr (Hjb0) = [1 	 (b0)]   1  F   (b0) + 	 (b0) 
(1  F ( (b0))) :
We end this section by noting that the top of the La¤er curve of debt corresponds to a lower debt
level in recession than during normal times.
Lemma 4 Let b = min
n
arg maxb2[b;~b] fQ (b; w) bg
o
and bR = min
n
arg maxb2[b;~b] fQ (b; w) bg
o
. Then,
bR  b; with equality holding only if 	 (b) = p (i.e., if the probability of staying in a recession is
exogenous).
The reason why the top of the La¤er curve under recession is located strictly to the left of b is
that the reform e¤ort is decreasing in debt (i.e., 	0 < 0) for b close to b, as established in Proposition
6. This implies that for b close to but smaller than b, bond revenue is strictly decreasing in b. By
reducing the newly-issued debt, the borrower increases the subsequent reform e¤ort, which in turn
increases the current bond price and debt revenue.
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3.4.3 Contracting on e¤ort
In equilibrium, there is no contracting on e¤ort, even though this is not ruled out at the outset. The
reason is that in a Markov equilibrium the market has no commitment power to dispense retrospective
punishment. To see why, consider the possibility for a syndicate of creditors to write a contract
specifying a reform e¤ort. In the spirit of the limited commitment approach of our paper, assume that
the maximum feasible punishment is to treat any deviation from the agreed e¤ort level as equivalent
to a default in the bond market. Namely, a sovereign who deviates from the agreed reform e¤ort would
be forced to default on the outstanding debt and pay the stochastic default cost . For simplicity, we
assume that a deviation at t triggers punishment in period t+1 when debt is defaulted (although this
timing assumption is not essential).
This threat could discipline, ex-ante, the sovereigns e¤ort. However, it would not be optimal
for the syndicate of creditors to carry out the punishment ex-post, since this would induce a loss
for creditors (the country would not repay its debt). More generally, once the sovereign has failed
to deliver the e¢ cient e¤ort level, it is never time-consistent to punish her. Therefore, the lack of
commitment embedded in the Markov equilibrium implies that e¤ort is not contractible.
3.4.4 Taking stock
The previous sections have established the main properties of the competitive equilibrium. The rst
property is that moral hazard induces an ine¢ cient provision of reform e¤ort in equilibrium, especially
for high debt levels. Figure 2 shows the e¤ort function 	 (b) in a calibrated economy. Note that the
reform e¤ort plunges for high debt levels.13 The hump-shaped e¤ort function contrasts sharply with
the optimum e¤ort in Proposition 1. In the rst best, reform e¤ort is monotone increasing in the
initial debt level, and remains constant over time. The second property is that the possibility of
renegotiating debt may improve risk sharing. This is per se welfare-enhancing but it exacerbates the
moral hazard in reform e¤ort.
The third property is that in periods when debt is fully honored, the equilibrium features positive
debt accumulation if the economy remains in recession, and constant debt when the economy returns
to normal times. An implication of the rst and third property is that, as the recession persists, the
reform e¤ort initially increases, but then, for high debt levels, it declines over time. Figure 3 illustrates
a time path for debt and consumption (left panel) and of the corresponding reform e¤ort (right panel)
for a particular simulated sequence of s. The volatility in consumption and e¤ort contrast sharply
with the optimal allocation of Proposition 1 where consumption and reform e¤ort are constant over
time.
The fourth property concerns post-renegotiation debt dynamics. Debt accumulation resumes im-
mediately after the haircut, while consumption increases upon debt relief and starts falling again
thereafter. This prediction is broadly consistent with the empirical evidence that economic conditions
of debtors improve following a debt relief, as documented in Reinhart and Trebesch (2016). It is
also consistent with the recent debt dynamics of Greece after the 2011 debt relief, the debt-GDP
ratio fell from 171% to 157%, but subsequently it increased back to 177%. Interestingly, the theory
predicts that for highly indebted countries a large haircut may enhance the reform e¤ort, contrary to
the common view that pardoning debt would have perverse e¤ects on incentives.
13This prediction is consistent with the casual observation that in the recent European debt crisis structural reforms
have met stronger opposition in highly indebted countries. Countries with moderate initial debt levels, such as for
instance Spain, have arguably been more prone to enact structural reforms than has Greece.
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Figure 2: Reform e¤ort function 	 (b) resulting from the benchmark calibration in Section 5.2.
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s in the competitive
equilibrium. In this particular simulation the recession ends at time T = 10.
16
For simplicity we have assumed that the sovereign can only issue one-period debt. Issuing debt
at multiple maturities could in principle allow the borrower to obtain some additional insurance. In
a world without moral hazard, this could complete the markets (cf. Angeletos 2002, Dovis 2016).
However, as we show in Section 3.5 below, in our model even an economy with GDP-linked debt
would fail to overcome the moral hazard problem associated with structural reforms. This mitigates
the concern about the loss of generality associated with the assumption that there is only one-period
debt. Moreover, we conjecture that if the borrower could issue debt at multiple maturities, it would
only issue one-period debt in steady state in order to limit the moral hazard problem.14
Finally, our focus on Markov equilibrium yields the extreme implication that renegotiations do not
a¤ect the terms at which the country can borrow in future. In particular, conditional on the debt level,
the risk premium is independent of the countrys credit history. This implies that renegotiations entail
no cost for the sovereign. In Appendix B (Section B.3), we present a simple extension where sovereigns
can be of di¤erent types, and the frequency of renegotiations induces learning thereby a¤ecting bond
prices. In this extension, renegotiations are less benign as they ruin the borrowers reputation.
3.5 Competitive equilibrium with GDP-linked debt
The analysis of the competitive equilibrium was carried out thus far under the assumption that the
sovereign can issue only a non-contingent asset. In this section, we extend the analysis and allow for
GDP-linked debt. We continue to focus on Markov equilibria.
Let bw and b w denote two securities paying one unit of output if the economy is in a recession or in
normal times, respectively. We label these securities recession-contingent debt and recovery-contingent
debt, respectively, and denote by Qw
 
b0w; b0w

and Q w
 
b0w; b0w

their corresponding prices. The budget
constraint in a recession is given by:
Qw
 
b0w; b
0
w
 b0w +Q w  b0w; b0w b0w = B (b; ; w) + c  w: (17)
Under limited commitment, the price of each security depends on the two outstanding debt levels,
as both a¤ect the reform e¤ort and the probability of renegotiation.15 The sovereigns value function
can be written as:
V (b; ; w) = max
fb0w;b0wg2([b;~b][b;~b])

u

Qw
 
b0w; b
0
w
 b0w +Q w  b0w; b0w b0w + w   B (b; ; w) (18)
 X  	  b0w; b0w+  1 	  b0w; b0wEV  b0w; w+ 	  b0w; b0wEV  b0w; w	 :
Mirroring the analysis in the case of non-state-contingent debt, we proceed in two steps. First, we
characterize the optimal reform e¤ort. This is determined by the di¤erence between the discounted
utility conditional on the recession ending and continuing, respectively (cf. Equation (14)):
X 0
 
	
 
b0w; b
0
w

= 
Z 1
0
V
 
b0w; 
0; w

dF () 
Z 1
0
V
 
b0w; 
0; w

dF ()

: (19)
Note that the incentive to reform would vanish under full insurance.
14Aguiar and Amador (2013) reach a similar conclusion in a di¤erent model. From an empirical standpoint, Broner,
Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2013) document that in emerging markets governments issue mostly short term debt.
15Note that these assets are not Arrow-Debreu assets since their payo¤s are not conditional on the realization of .
An alternative approach would have been to follow Alvarez and Jermann (2000) and issue an Arrow-Debreu asset for
each state (w; ) and let the default-driven participation constraint serve as an endogenous borrowing constraint.
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Next, we characterize consumption and debt issuance. To this aim, consider rst the equilibrium
asset prices. The prices of the recession- and recovery-contingent debt are given by, respectively:
Qw
 
b0w; b
0
w

=
1 	  b0w; b0w
R
  
1  F    b0w+ 1b0w
Z (b0w)
0
 
 1 () dF ()
!
; (20)
Q w
 
b0w; b
0
w

=
	
 
b0w; b0w

R
  
1  F    b0w+ 1b0w
Z (b0w)
0
 
 1 () dF ()
!
: (21)
The next proposition characterizes the CEE with GDP-linked debt.
Proposition 8 Assume that there exist markets for two securities delivering one unit of output if the
economy is in recession and in normal times, respectively, and subject to the risk of renegotiation.
Suppose that the economy is initially in recession. The following CEEs are satised in the competitive
equilibrium:
(I) If the recession continues,
u0
 
c0jH;w

u0 (c)| {z }
MRS if rec. continues
= 1 +
@
@b0w
	
 
b0w; b
0
w

| {z }
>0
 R
 
b0w; b0w
 
1  F    b0w  1 	  b0w; b0w| {z }
>0
: (22)
(II) If the recession ends,
u0 (c0jH; w)
u0 (c)| {z }
MRS if rec. ends
= 1 +
@
@b0w
	
 
b0w; b
0
w

| {z }
<0
 R
 
b0w; b0w
 
1  F   (b0w)	  b0w; b0w| {z };
>0
(23)
where

 
b0w; b
0
w
  Q w  b0w; b0w b0w
	
 
b0w; b0w
   Qw  b0w; b0w b0w
1 	  b0w; b0w  0: (24)
Moreover,
c = Qw
 
b0w; b
0
w
 b0w +Q w  b0w; b0w b0w + w   B (b; ; w) ;
c0jH;w = Qw
 
B w
 
b0w

; B w
 
b0w
Bw  b0w+Q w  Bw  b0w ; B w  b0wB w  b0w+ w   b0w;
c0jH; w = Q
 
B
 
b0w; w

; w
B  b0w; w+ w   b0w;
where Bw
 
b0w

and B w
 
b0w

denote the optimal level of newly-issued recession- and recovery-contingent
debt when the recession continues, and debt is honored.
If the probability that the recession ends were exogenous, 	0 = 0, consumption would be inde-
pendent of the realization of the aggregate state. In this case, the CEEs imply constant consumption
c0jH;w = c0jH; w = c where, recall, c0jH;w is consumption conditional on debt being honored in the next
period. However, in the general case with moral hazard, consumption falls (and recession-contingent
debt increases) whenever the economy remains in recession and debt is honored, as shown by Equa-
tion (22). When the recession ends, consumption increases as shown by Equation (23). Therefore, the
competitive equilibrium features imperfect insurance, even conditional on honoring the debt.
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The intuition is as follows. By issuing more recession-contingent debt, the country strengthens
its incentive to make reforms, since @	=@b0w > 0. This induces the sovereign to issue more recession-
contingent debt than in the absence of moral hazard. This e¤ect is stronger the larger is 
 
b0w; b0w

which can be interpreted as the net expected gain accruing to the lenders from a marginal increase
in the probability that the recession ends. On the contrary, issuing more recovery-contingent debt
weakens the incentives to do reform. As a result, consumption increases if the recession ends and falls
if the recession continues (and debt is honored). This result highlights the trade-o¤ between insurance
and incentives: the country must give up insurance in order to gain credibility about its willingness
to do reforms. In addition, debt inuences the reform e¤ort: this is increasing in the newly-issued
recession-contingent debt and decreasing in the newly-issued recovery-contingent debt. In summary,
the moral hazard problem in reform limits the possibility for the equilibrium with GDP-linked debt
to smooth consumption and reform e¤ort.
4 Optimal contract with one-sided commitment
In the competitive equilibrium of the previous section, the sovereign cannot commit to the e¢ cient
reform e¤ort and creditors cannot commit to punishments that are ex-post suboptimal. In this section,
we characterize the allocation chosen by a benevolent social planner who can commit to enforce
a contract even by dispensing punishments that are not ex-post optimal. However, the borrower
continues to be subject to limited commitment. This limits the planners ability to punish deviations
from the optimal contract. In particular, the maximum punishment the planner can impose is to
terminate the contract and let the sovereign resort to the competitive equilibrium. In the next section,
we interpret this allocation as the result of an assistance program managed by an international agency
(e.g., the IMF) that can commit to terminate its program in case of non-compliance. We consider two
scenarios. In the rst, the reform e¤ort is observable, while in the second it is not. We continue to
assume, as in the competitive equilibrium, that the realization of  is publicly observable.
The problem is formulated as a one-sided commitment program, following Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2012) and based on a promised-utility approach in the vein of Spear and Srivastava (1987), Thomas
and Worrall (1988 and 1990) and Kocherlakota (1996).
We denote by  the utility promised to the risk-averse agent in the beginning of the period, before
the realization of .  is the key state variable of the problem. We denote by ! and ! the promised
continuation utilities conditional on the realization  and on the aggregate state w and w, respectively.
P () and P () denote the expected present value of prots accruing to the principal conditional on
delivering the promised utility  in the most cost-e¤ective way in recession and in normal times,
respectively. The planning problem is evaluated after the uncertainty about the aggregate state has
been resolved (i.e., the economy is either in recession or in normal times in the current period), but
before the realization of  is known. In Appendix B (Proposition 16), we prove, following the strategy
in Thomas and Worrall (1990), that the functional equations dened in Equations (25) and (30) below
are contraction mappings, that the prot functions P () and P () are decreasing, strictly concave
and continuously di¤erentiable, and that the associated maximands are unique.
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4.1 Normal times
In normal times, the optimal value P () satises the following functional equation:
P () = max
fc;!g2@
Z
@

w   c + 1
R
P (!)

dF () ; (25)
where the maximization is subject to the constraintsZ
@
[u (c) + !] dF ()  ; (26)
u (c) + !  W (0; w)  ;  2 @; (27)
c 2 [0; w]; ; ! 2 [W (0; w)  E [] ;W (0; w)]:
The inequality (26) is a promise-keeping constraint, whereas (27) is a participation constraint (PC).
Note that the outside option for the agent is equivalent to the value of default in the competitive
equilibrium.
The application of recursive methods allows us to establish the following proposition.
Proposition 9 Assume the economy is in normal times. (I) For all realizations  such that the PC
of the agent, (27), is binding, ! >  and the solution for (c; !) is determined by the following
conditions:
u0 (c) =   1P 0 (!)
; (28)
u (c) + ! = W (0; w)  : (29)
The solution is not history-dependent, i.e., the initial promise, ; does not matter. (II) For all real-
izations  such that the PC of the agent, (27), is not binding, ! =  and c = c (), where c () is
determined by (28). The solution is history-dependent.
The constrained optimal allocation (COA) has standard properties. Whenever the agents PC is
not binding, consumption and promised utility remain constant over time. Whenever the PC binds,
the planner increases the agents consumption and promised utility in order to meet her PC.
4.2 Recession
When the economy is in recession, the contract species also an e¤ort level. We consider rst the case
in which the reform e¤ort is observable. In this case, the planner terminates the contract whenever
the agent deviates from the e¢ cient e¤ort level. We assume that when the agent deviates at time t,
she is settled with the default cost at t+ 1. Note that this allocation is equivalent to a decentralized
equilibrium in which the sovereign can issue debt contingent both on the aggregate level and on the
borrowers e¤ort.
The reform e¤ort associated with a deviation is given by
pdev = arg max
p2[p;p]
 X (p) +  ((1  p)W (0; w) + pW (0; w))
! X 0 (pdev) =  (W (0; w) W (0; w))
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Then, the continuation utility from a deviation is given by
dev   X (pdev) + 
 
(1  pdev)W (0; w) + pdevW (0; w)  E

0

;
where E

0

denotes the expected value of 0:
We can now characterize the optimal contract under recession
P () = max
fc;p;!;!g2@
Z
@

w   c +
1
R
 
(1  p)P
 
!

+ p P (!)

dF () ; (30)
where the maximization is subject to the constraintsZ
@
 
u
 
c
 X (p) +   (1  p)! + p! dF ()  ; (31)
u
 
c
 X (p) +   (1  p)! + p!  W (0; w)  ;  2 @; (32)
 X (p) + 
 
(1  p)! + p!
  dev (33)
c 2 [0; w]; p 2 [p; p]; ; ! 2 [W (0; w)  E [] ;W (0; w)]; ! 2 [W (0; w)  E [] ;W (0; w)]:
We prove in Appendix B (Proposition 16) that the program is concave, and that the FOCs are
necessary and su¢ cient. The FOCs with respect to !; !; and p (see Equations (63)(66) in
Appendix A) yield:16
P 0 (!) = P 0
 
!

(34)
X 0 (p) = 
 
!   !
  R 1
P 0
 
!
   P (!)  P  ! : (35)
Equation (34) establishes that the planner equates the marginal prot loss associated with promised
utilities in the two aggregate states. (35) establishes that e¤ort is set at the constrained e¢ cient level.
The two terms on the right hand-side are the benets accruing to the agent and to the principal,
respectively. Note that in the competitive equilibrium the sovereign only takes into consideration the
private gain of exerting e¤ort, so the second term is missing.
The IC constraint may or may not be binding. When it is binding, (34), (35) and the IC constraint
pin down a unique (constant) level of promised utilities and e¤ort. We state this formally in the
following Lemma.
Lemma 5 When the IC is binding, e¤ort and promised utilities are constant at the levels ! = !;
! = !
 and p = p, where the triplet (p; !; !) is uniquely determined by the IC constraint (33)
holding with equality, (34), and (35).
When the IC constraint is not binding, consumption is pinned down by the following standard
FOC (see Equations (63) and (64) in Appendix A):
u0
 
c

=   1
P 0
 
!
 : (36)
16To see why the solution to (34)(35) is unique, note that the strict concavity and monotonicity of P and P imply
that Equation (34) determines a strictly positive relationship between ! and !. Thus, Equation (35) yields an implicit
strictly decreasing relationship between p and ! and an implicit strictly increasing relationship between p and !.
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This condition does not hold when the IC constraint is binding, since the planner must in this case
distort the consumption margin.
We characterize the optimal contract by distinguishing two cases. Proposition 10 covers the case
in which the initial promised utility is high and the IC constraint is not binding irrespective of the
realization of . Proposition 11 covers the case in which the initial promised utility is low and the IC
constraint is binding for a non-empty range of realizations of .
It is useful to dene ~() as the threshold realization of  such that the participation constraint is
binding for a given . In particular, ~() is implicitly dened by the promise-keeping constraint (31),
 = W (0; w) 
"Z ~(v)
0
dF () + ~()
h
1  F (~(v))
i#
; (37)
where ~() is decreasing in .
Proposition 10 Suppose that the economy starts in a recession with promised utility   !: Then,
the IC constraint (33) is never binding (irrespective of ), and the optimal contract is characterized
as follows:
1. If  < ~(), the PC is binding, and the solution for
 
c; p; !; !

is determined by (34), (35),
(36) and by (32) holding with equality. Moreover, ! > .
2. If   ~(), the PC is slack, and the solution for  c; p; !; ! is given by ! = ; c = c () ;
! = ! () ; and p = p (), where the functions c () ; ! () and p () are determined by (36),
(34), (35), respectively. The solution is history-dependent. The reform e¤ort is decreasing and
consumption and future promised utility are increasing in .
When  < !, the solution of Proposition 10 would violate the IC constraint in some states. Thus,
the planner must either reduce the demands on e¤ort or increase the promise utilities so that the IC
constraint holds. The following proposition characterizes the optimal contract in this case.
Proposition 11 Suppose that the economy starts in a recession with promised utility  < !. Then,
the IC constraint (33) is binding in some states, and the optimal contract is characterized as follows:
1. If  < ~(!), the PC is binding while the IC is not binding. The solution is not history-dependent
and is determined as in Proposition 10, part 1 (in particular, ! > !
 and p < p).
2. If  2 [~(!); ~()], both the PC and the IC are binding. E¤ort and promised utilities are equal
to (p; !; !) as given by Lemma 5. Consumption is determined by (32) and (33) jointly, which
yield:
c = u
 1 (W (0; w)    dev) : (38)
Consumption and e¤ort are lower and promised utilities are higher than in the absence of an IC
constraint.
3. If  > ~(), the IC is binding, while the PC is not binding. E¤ort and promised utilities are
equal to (p; !; !) : Consumption is constant across  and is determined by (31) and (33),
which yield:
c = u
 1

W (0; w)  ~()  dev

: (39)
Consumption and e¤ort are lower and promised utilities are higher than in the absence of an IC
constraint.
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Figure 4: Simulation of consumption, e¤ort, and promised utilities for a particular sequence of s
where the IC is initially binding. Solid lines refer to the planner solution with the IC constraint.
Dashed lines refer to the planner solution without the IC constraint. In this particular simulation the
recession ends at time T = 10.
Consider an economy where, initially,  < !. If  < ~(!) (case 1), the binding PC induces
the planner to set an e¤ort level so low that the IC is not binding. The allocation is not history-
dependent, and the characterization of Proposition 10 applies. For all levels of  larger than ~(!),
the IC is binding, and Lemma 5 implies that e¤ort and promised utility are equal to (p; !; !), i.e.
the maximum e¤ort and the minimum promised future utilities consistent with the IC. In particular,
if  2 [~(!); ~()] (case 2), consumption is pinned down jointly by the PC and IC. In this case,
consumption is decreasing in . Finally, if  > ~() (case 3) the PC is slack, and consumption is
constant across  and determined by the promise-keeping constraint. Note that whenever the IC
constraint is binding (cases 2 and 3), both consumption and e¤ort are lower than in Proposition
10. Intuitively, the planner satises the IC and promise-keeping constraints by reducing current
consumption and e¤ort, and by increasing promised utilities relative to the case in which the IC
constraint is not binding. Thus, the contract provides less consumption insurance but more e¤ort
smoothing.
Note that the IC constraint binds for at most one period. After that either the recession ends, or
the planner sets the promised utility to the level !: Either way, the IC constraint becomes irrelevant,
and the equilibrium is characterized as in Proposition 10.
Figure 4 represents an economy in which the IC is binding in the initial period, i.e.,  < !.
It shows simulated paths of consumption, e¤ort and promised utility. For comparison, the gure
also displays (dashed lines) the allocation in an otherwise identical economy where the planner can
control the e¤ort without the IC constraint. In the rst period, consumption and e¤ort are lower
in the economy with an IC constraint. In contrast, promised utility is higher. In other words, the
IC constraint forces the planner to provide less insurance by making consumption and e¤ort initially
lower, but growing at a higher speed. As of the second period, the dynamics of both economies are
the same.
Note the sharp contrast of these dynamics relative to the competitive equilibrium of Section 3.4.
There, consumption is falling (and debt accumulates) when the country honors its debt. In contrast,
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in the COA the planner insures the agents consumption by keeping it constant whenever the PC is not
binding. Therefore, the competitive equilibrium underprovides insurance. The dynamics of the reform
e¤ort also are sharply di¤erent. In the COA, e¤ort is a monotone decreasing function of promised
utility which is in turn step-wise increasing over time (cf. Figure 4). In contrast, in the competitive
equilibrium the reform e¤ort is hump-shaped in debt. Since debt increases over time (unless it is
renegotiated), e¤ort is also hump-shaped over time conditional on no renegotiation.
4.3 Unobservable reform e¤ort
When the reform e¤ort is not observable, deviations in e¤ort cannot be sanctioned. Thus, dev is
replaced by ~
 
!   !

=  X (p) + 
 
p! + (1  p)!

; where
p = arg max
p
 X (p) +   p! + (1  p)!
! X 0 (p) = 
 
!   !

! p = 
 
!   !

(40)
Moreover, the IC constraint always holds. Note that e¤ort is now ine¢ ciently provided, since the
agent does not internalize the benet of e¤ort provision that accrues to the planner.
The FOCs with respect to ! and !, together with the envelope condition, yield (see proof of
Proposition 12 in Appendix A):
P 0
 
!
  P 0 (!) = 0(!   !)
(!   !)
+
0(!   !)
1 (!   !)

P (!)  P
 
!

(41)
1
u0(c)
=  

P 0
 
!
  0(!   !)
1 (!   !)

P (!)  P
 
!

: (42)
The FOC (41) is the analogue of (34). Note that the planner does no longer equalize the marginal
cost of promised utility in the two states. The reason is that increasing the di¤erence in promised
utility is the only way for the planner to increase e¤ort provision. Thus, the unobservability of e¤ort
reduces insurance.
We can now establish the following proposition.
Proposition 12 Suppose that the economy starts in a recession and e¤ort is not observable. Then,
the optimal contract is characterized as follows: (i) p = 
 
!   !

as in (40), and (ii):
1. If  < ~(); the PC is binding, and the solution for
 
c; !; !

is determined by (41), (42),
and by (32) holding with equality.
2. If   ~(); the PC is slack, and the solution for  c; !; ! is determined by (41), (42), and
by the FOC for consumption
u0
 
c

=   1
P 0 ()
:
The solution is history-dependent (i.e., c = c () ; ! = ! () < ; and ! = ! ()). As long as
the recession persists and the PC remains slack, consumption and promised utilities are falling
and e¤ort is increasing over time.
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The results when e¤ort is not unobservable di¤er sharply from the case in which e¤ort is observ-
able and the planner has commitment. In this case, the dynamics are more similar to those of the
competitive equilibrium without commitment. Consumption falls over time whenever  is su¢ ciently
high. This is the way the planner gives dynamic incentives: she curtails insurance in order to extract
higher e¤ort over time.
4.4 Comparison between the COA and the competitive equilibrium
The rst result is that in normal times the planning allocation in Proposition 9 is identical to the
competitive equilibrium. To establish the equivalence result we return, rst, to the competitive equi-
librium. Let
 (b) =
 
1  F   (b) b+ Z (b)
0
b^ (; w) dF () (43)
denote the expected value for the creditors of an outstanding debt b before the current-period un-
certainty is resolved. Note that  (b) yields the expected debt repayment, which is lower than the
face value of debt, since in some states of nature debt is renegotiated. To prove the equivalence, we
postulate that  (b) = P () ; and show that in this case  = EV (b; w).17 If the planning allocation
were more e¢ cient than the equilibrium, then we would nd that  > EV (b; w) :
Proposition 13 Assume that the economy is in normal times. The competitive equilibrium is equiv-
alent to the planning allocation in Proposition 9, namely,  (b) = P (),  = EV (b; w) :
Intuitively, renegotiation provides the market economy with su¢ ciently many state contingencies
to attain second-best e¢ ciency. This result hinges on two features of the renegotiation protocol. First,
renegotiation averts any real loss associated with unordered default. Second, creditors have all the
bargaining power in the renegotiation game.18 Moreover, note that in normal times there is no issue
of commitment since e¤ort is only exerted in recession.
The equivalence result of Proposition 13 hinges on the assumption that normal times is an absorbing
state that will be relaxed in Section 5 below. Moreover, even in the current environment, it does not
carry over to recessions. We will show that in recession the result hinges on two critical assumptions
about the planning problem: whether e¤ort is observable and whether the sovereign can issue GDP-
linked debt.
It is instructive to start by analyzing with a case in which there is no moral hazard problem, i.e.,
the probability that the recession ends is independent of the reform e¤ort (i.e., 	 = p).
Proposition 14 If the probability that the recession ends is independent of the reform e¤ort (i.e.,
	 = p), then the competitive equilibrium with GDP-linked debt is constrained e¢ cient conditional on
p. Namely, if e¤ort is set at the constrained optimum level the equilibrium allocation is identical to
the planning allocation of Proposition 12 where the outside option W (0; w) in Equation (32) is the
value function associated with a competitive equilibrium with GDP-linked debt.
17Recall that EV (b; w) =
R
@ V (b; ; w) dF () denotes the discounted utility accruing to a country with the debt level
b in the competitive Markov equilibrium.
18We view this as a useful benchmark. In reality, renegotiations may entail costs associated with legal proceeds and
lawsuits, trade retaliation, temporary market exclusion, etc. Also, creditors may not have the full ex-post bargaining
power at the renegotiation stage as in Yue (2010). This would reduce the amount of loans creditors can recover. In all
these cases, the competitive equilibrium would fail to implement the COA.
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The equivalence of Proposition 14 breaks down if there is moral hazard, and the market cannot
commit to punish deviations in reform e¤ort. The qualitative dynamics are also di¤erent. In the
equilibrium with GDP-linked debt of Section 3.5, consumption falls (and recession-contingent debt
increases) whenever the economy remains in recession and debt is honored, as shown by Equation
(22). On the contrary, consumption increases whenever the recession ends, as shown by Equation
(23).
For the equilibrium with GDP-linked debt to decentralize the planning allocation of Proposition
10, the sovereign should be able to commit to the e¢ cient reform level. In particular, the planner
should issue securities that are conditioned not only on GDP but also on the exerted e¤ort level.
If a market for such securities existed, the sovereign would promise a repayment that is equivalent
to the optimal contract at the optimal e¤ort level. For any other e¤ort level, the payment would
be that associated with the maximum debt level b. This implies that if there is a deviation from the
equilibrium e¤ort debt would be renegotiated with certainty in the following period. This ensures that
the IC constraint holds in the competitive equilibrium. Clearly, this type of state-contingent debt is
a stand-in for commitment. Their existence requires reform e¤ort to be both observable and veriable
in courts, which we view as a strong assumption.
Finally, the competitive equilibrium with GDP-linked debt can sustain a COA where the planner
cannot observe e¤ort. The proof of this equivalence is harder, as it is di¢ cult to prove that the
planning problem is concave in general when e¤ort is not observable. This is a common problem
in the literature (see Renner and Schmedders 2015). Therefore, the equivalence is stated under the
assumption that the rst-order conditions are su¢ cient for the planning problem. This assumption
can be veried numerically, as we do in the numerical analysis below.
Proposition 15 Assume that the economy is in recession. Consider the planning allocation with
unobservable e¤ort of Proposition 12 where the outside option W (0; w) in Equation (32) is the value
function associated with a competitive equilibrium with GDP-linked debt. Assume that the rst-order
conditions are necessary and su¢ cient. This planning allocation can be sustained as a competitive
equilibrium with state contingent debt (cf. Proposition 3.5), namely,  (b) = P (),  = EV (b; w).
The proposition establishes that if e¤ort is not observable, then, commitment is of no value to the
planner. Then, the market decentralizes the planner allocation in the vein of Prescott and Townsend
(1984).19 An immediate corollary of Proposition 15 is that the planning allocation of Proposition 12
is more e¢ cient than the equilibrium without GDP-linked debt.
4.5 Interpreting the COA as an austerity program
In this section, we discuss a policy-relevant institutional interpretation of the COA. Consider a stand-
by program run by an international institution, e.g., the IMF. Like the planner, and unlike the market,
the IMF can punish deviations, but cannot get around the limited commitment problem, i.e., the
indebted country can pay the default cost and walk away unilaterally. We show that the planner
allocation can be interpreted as a combination of transfers (or loans), repayment schedules, reform
program and renegotiation strategy. This program has two key features. First, the country cannot
run an independent scal policy, i.e., it is not allowed to issue additional debt in the market. Second,
the program is subject to renegotiation. More precisely, whenever the country credibly threatens to
19See also Dovis (2016) for a related result in a setting where the sovereign has private information about productivity
shocks and a market with short and long-lived bonds can implement the constrained optimum.
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abandon the program, the international institution should sweeten the deal by increasing the transfers,
reducing the required e¤ort, and reducing the debt the country owes when the recession ends. When
no credible threat of default is on the table, consumption and reform e¤ort should be held constant as
long as the recession lasts. When the recession ends, the international institution receives a payment
from the country, nanced by issuing debt in the market.
Let  denote the present discounted utility guaranteed to the country when the program is rst
agreed upon. Let co () and po () be the consumption and reform e¤ort associated with the promised
utility in the planning problem. Upon entering the program, the country receives a transfer equal to
T () + b0; where T () = co ()   w (note that T () could be negative). In the subsequent periods,
the country is guaranteed the transfer ow T () so long as the recession lasts and there is no credible
request of renegotiating the terms of the austerity program. In other words, the international insti-
tution rst bails out the country from its obligations to creditors, and then becomes the sole residual
claimant of the countrys sovereign debt. The country is also asked to exert a reform e¤ort po (). If
the country faces a low realization of  and threatens to leave the program, the institution improves
the terms of the program so as to match the countrys outside option. Thereafter, consumption and
e¤ort are held constant at new higher and lower levels, respectively, as in the planners allocation.
And so on, for as long as the recession continues.
As soon as the recession ends, the country owes a debt bN to the international institution, deter-
mined by the equation
Q (bN ; w) bN = co (N )  w + bN :
Here N is the expected utility granted to the country after the most recent round of renegotiation.
After receiving this payment, the international institution terminates the program and lets the country
nance its debt in the market.
This program resembles an austerity program, in the sense that the country is prevented from
running an independent scal policy and reform program. In particular, the country would like to
issue extra debt after entering the stand-by agreement, so austerity is a binding constraint. In addition,
the country would like to shirk on the reform e¤ort prescribed by the agreement. Thus, the sovereign
would like to (temporarily) deviate from the optimal plan, and promises about future transfers is an
essential feature of the program.
A distinctive feature of the assistance program is that the international institution sets "harsh"
entry conditions in anticipation of future renegotiations. How harsh these conditions are depends on
: In turn,  may reect a political decision about how many (if any) own resources the international
institution wishes to commit to rescuing the indebted country. A natural benchmark is to set  such
that the international institution makes zero prots (and zero losses) in expectation. Whether, ex-
post, the international institution makes net gains or losses hinges on the duration of the recession
and on the realized sequence of s.
Another important policy implication of our analysis is that it would be suboptimal for the inter-
national institution to commit never to accept any renegotiation. On the contrary, such a policy would
lead to welfare losses because, on the one hand, there would be ine¢ cient default in equilibrium; on the
other hand, the country could not expect future improvements, and therefore would not accept a very
low initial consumption, or a very high reform e¤ort. If the international institutions expected prot
were zero in both programs, the country would receive a lower expected utility from the alternative
(no renegotiation) program.
In summary, our theory prescribes a pragmatic approach to debt renegotiation. Credible threats of
default should be appeased by reducing the debt and softening the austerity program. Such approach
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is often criticized for creating bad incentives. In our model, such appeasement is precisely the optimal
policy under the reasonable assumption that penalties on sovereign countries for breaking an agreement
are limited.
5 Recurrent recessions and quantitative analysis
In this section, we generalize the model and study its quantitative properties from a positive and
normative standpoint.
5.1 Recurrent recessions
In order to align the model with the data, we relax the assumption that there exists an absorbing state
and assume, instead, that in normal times the economy falls into a deep recession with an exogenous
probability p^. Additionally, we relax the assumption that R = 1: In particular, we emphasize the case
in which R < 1 since this ensures that the competitive equilibrium has a non-degenerate stationary
distribution (cf. Aiyagari 1994).
While most properties discussed in the previous section carry over to this generalization, the
economy will feature some qualitative di¤erences relative to the analysis in Sections 3-4 above. First,
in normal times, the sovereign engages in precautionary savings to accumulate a bu¤er in expectation of
future recessions. Therefore, consumption and wealth are not constant during normal times even when
debt is honored.20 The qualitative debt dynamics in the stationary equilibrium have the following
features. In normal times, debt (when honored) tends to a target level. During recession, when
honored, debt increases unambiguously with dynamics qualitatively similar to those of Section 3.4.
Assuming R < 1 also a¤ects the planning allocation. The rst-best now features ever-decreasing
consumption and increasing e¤ort when the economy is in recession. The planning allocation with
one-sided commitment and observable e¤ort of Section 4.2 is a¤ected in a similar fashion: when neither
the participation nor the IC constraint are binding, the allocation yields rising e¤ort and declining
consumption and promised utility. Consequently, the IC constraint may bind recurrently: the IC
constraint sets a oor to the continuation utility below which the agent would choose to exit the
contract and resort to market nancing.
5.2 Calibration
We calibrate the model economy to match salient moments of observed debt-to-GDP ratios and default
premia for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (GIIPS). A model period corresponds to one
year. We set p^ = 0:01. This low probability is intended to capture rare and severe downturns ignoring
standard uctuations on a business cycle frequency. We normalize the GDP during normal times
to w = 1 and assume that the recession causes a drop in income of 40%, i.e., w = 0:6  w. This
corresponds to the fall of GDP per capita for Greece between 2007 and 2013, relative to trend.21
Since we focus on the return on sovereign debt, the annual real gross interest rate is set to R = 1:02.
The utility function is assumed to be CRRA with a relative risk aversion of 2.
20Moreover, as anticipated above, Proposition 13 is no longer true.
21GDP per capita of Greece fell from 22700 to 16800 Euro between 2007 and 2013 (Eurostat, nama_10_pc series).
The annualized growth rate between 1997 and 2007 was 3.6%. The fall in output between 2007 and 2013 relative to
trend was therefore 40%.
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We calibrate the discount factor  to target a stationary average debt 54.9% of GDP in line with
the evidence for the GIIPS over the period 1950-2015.22 We assume an isoelastic e¤ort cost function,
X(p) = 1+1='(p)
1+1=', where  regulates the average level of e¤ort and ' regulates the elasticity of
reform e¤ort to changes in the return to reforms. We calibrate the two parameters, ' and ; so as
to match two points on the equilibrium e¤ort function 	 (b). In particular, we target the e¤ort at
the debt limit, 	
 
b

= 10%, so that a country at the debt limit would choose an e¤ort inducing an
expected duration of the recession of one decade (we have Greece in mind). Moreover, we target a
maximum e¤ort, maxb 	 (b) = 20%, inducing an expected recession duration of ve years (we have
Iceland and Ireland in mind).
Finally, we calibrate the support and the distribution of the default cost  so that the model
matches key moments of the quantity and price of sovereign debt. One common problem in the
quantitative literature on sovereign debt is that those models fail to match observed values of debt-
to-GDP ratios under standard parameterization (Arellano 2008; Yue 2010). This is not a problem in
our model. In fact, the maximum default cost realization  is calibrated to target a debt limit during
normal times of b= w = 178% which corresponds to the maximum sustainable debt reported in Collard
et al. (2015, Table 3, Column 1).23 Moreover, the distribution f() is parametrized to target an
average default premium of 4:04% for a country which has a debt-output ratio of 100% in recession.
This was the average debt and average default premium for the GIIPS during 2008-2012 (Eurostat).
In particular, we assume that    is distributed exponential with rate parameter  and truncation
point .24 We then calibrate  to target the above default premium. Table 1 summarizes the targeted
empirical moments and the resulting calibration of the parameters. The ve parameters ,, , ',
and  are calibrated simultaneously to minimize the squared distance (in percentage and with equal
weights) between the empirical and the model generated moments.
5.3 Quantitative predictions
The model is solved by discretizing the state space and iterating on the value functions and the default
threshold functions. The benchmark calibration uses 5000 grid points for debt and 600 for the default
cost :Measured by the Euler Equation errors, the numerical approximation of the equilibrium is very
accurate. See Appendix B for details on the algorithm.
Figure 5 illustrates the properties of the calibrated economy by showing a simulated path for an
economy that starts in a recession with an initial debt-GDP ratio of 100% (b = 0:6). The dotted
lines indicate the renegotiation episodes and the grey shades indicate recessions. Panel (a) shows the
path for consumption and e¤ort in the competitive equilibrium. The economy starts in a recession,
then recovers at T = 11, then falls again into a recession at T = 31, and nally recovers atT = 40.
Consumption is lower during recession, and it falls throughout both recession periods except after
renegotiation. E¤ort follows a non-monotonic dynamic being increasing at moderate debt levels and
falling in the debt overhang region. Panel (b) shows the associated debt dynamics. Note that during
recessions debt accumulates rapidly and renegotiations are more likely (on average, the calibrated
22We use the debt-to-GDP ratios reported by Eurostat for the period 1995-2015. For earlier periods, we chain the
debt levels back to 1950 with the series reported in the Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2010) dataset.
23We ignore the value of 282% for Korea which is a clear outlier.
24More formally,  has the p.d.f.
f() =
e (
 )
1  e  ,  2 [0;
]:
Here, f() is strictly increasing in ; and higher values of  are associated with a larger probability mass in the upper
tail of the distribution.
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Target Data Model Par. Value
Average debt: 54.9% 53.7%  0.972
(% GDP, GIIPS, 1950-2015)
Bond spread: 4.04% 3.99%  1.804
(GIIPS, at 100% debt-output ratio, 2008-2012)
Maximum debt level: 178% 176%  2.134
(% of normal output, Collard et al. 2015)
Expected recession duration: 5 4.95 ' 14.24
(at max. reform e¤ort, years)
Expected recession duration: 10 9.99  14.55
(at the debt limit b, years)
Table 1: Model calibration
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Figure 5: Simulation of competitive equilibrium, second-best, and rst-best in the calibrated economy
with recurrent recessions and R < 1.
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economy yields renegotiation 39% of the time in recession and 4% of the time in normal times). In
normal times debt decreases or increases depending on whether the current debt level is above or
below the target level.
Panel (c) shows consumption and e¤ort when the latter is observable and there is a market for GDP-
linked debt (i.e., the planning allocation of Section 4.2). Note that consumption falls by the annual
factor (R)
1
  0:992 in non-renegotiation periods irrespective of the aggregate state. During recession,
consumption falls less steeply than in the competitive equilibrium. Reform e¤ort increases during
recessions in non-renegotiation periods. Finally, panel (d) shows the reform e¤ort and consumption
in the rst best. Here consumption is initially high and falls at the rate (R)
1
 throughout. E¤ort
increases over time, accordingly.
Table 2 shows the quantitative predictions of the competitive equilibrium for moments that we have
not targeted, and compares them to their empirical counterparts. Our calibration yields a stationary
bond spread with an average of 3.0% and a standard deviation of 8.0%. The average is close to the
2.5% bond spread reported for the GIIPS relative to Germany over the period 1992-2015, while the
model yields too much variation in the spread compared to the data. The renegotiation probability in
the stationary equilibrium is predicted to be 6.5%, which lies in the middle of the range of estimates
reported in Tomz and Wright (2013, Section 4.2).25 During renegotiation periods, the model generates
recovery values and investor losses that are remarkably close to the ones reported in the literature.
The simulations yield an average haircut 41% of the debts face value, which is just above the interval
of empirical estimates reported in Tomz and Wright (2013, Section 4.4). This is remarkable, given
that this moment was not targeted in the calibration. The model also produces a high variation in
haircuts which is just 2 percentage points below the one documented in Cruces and Trebesch (2013).
Moreover, Reinhart and Trebesch (2016) document the average debt relief (in terms of market value)
to have been 21% of GDP for advanced economies in the 1930s and 16% of GDP for emerging market
economies in the 1980s/1990s. On average, our model yields a 21% debt relief in terms of GDP which
is in line with their estimates. Our simulation results are also in line with Asonuma and Trebesch
(2016, Table 2 and 3) who show that debt-GDP ratios are higher in renegotiation periods (89.7%)
compared to the average debt-GDP ratio (53.7%). Finally, a great recession in the model lasts on
average 6.4 years and the unconditional probability of being in recession is 6.0%.
25Sovereign default and renegotiation are rare events. For haircuts and renegotiation probabilities we therefore use
data for a longer time period and for a broader set of countries than the GIIPS during 1992-2015.
26The empirical moments of the bond spread are calculated from the EMU convergence criterion bond yields which
are reported by Eurostat for the GIIPS over the period 1992-2015.
27Tomz and Wright (2013, Section 4.2) suggests this range of estimates considering several countries. Interestingly,
they also report four default waves, where at least 30% of the worlds debtors where in default. This is close to the
renegotation probability of 39% that we report for recession periods. For Argentina, Arellano (2008) targets a 3%
default probability.
28 In historical data on sovereign debt restructurings, Benjamin and Wright (2009, Table 1) report an average haircut
38% in terms of market value. Cruces and Trebesch (2013) report a 40% market value haircut, and a 37% haircut
according to the Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2008) methodology. Tomz and Wright (2013, Section 4.4) provide a
more detailed overview of estimates. Since we only consider one-period discount bonds in the model, face value and
market value haircuts mostly overlap according to the above methodologies.
29Reinhart and Trebesch (2016).
30Cruces and Trebesch (2013, Table 1).
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Data Model Recession Normal
Bond spread, avg. (GIIPS)26 2.54% 3.0% 20.5% 1.6%
Bond spread, std. (GIIPS) 2.54% 8.0% 22.8% 1.3%
Renegotiation, prob.27 [1.7%,13%] 6.5% 39.0% 4.0%
Renegotiation periods
Haircut, avg.28 [37%,40%] 41.4% 36.8% 42.0%
Haircut, std.29 27% 24.7% 18.2% 29.0%
Investor loss (% GDP)30 [16%,21%] 21.1% 12.3% 23.7%
Debt (% GDP) - 89.7% 185.5% 66.3%
Recession periods
Exp. duration recession - - 6.4 yrs -
Prob. being in recession - - 6.0% -
Table 2: Non-targeted moments
Stationary Distribution Recession (b0=y0 = 1)
Cons. Equiv.(%) Debt Equiv.(%) Cons.Equiv.(%) Debt Equiv.(%)
First Best 6.1 241 13.2 580
GDP-linked debt 1.0 37 0.9 34
One-sided commitment 1.7 60 3.0 113
Full Commit. & Inc. Mkts 4.7 183 11.0 475
Table 3: Welfare gains of allocations with less frictions
5.4 Welfare comparison
We use the calibrated economy to evaluate the welfare gains of di¤erent policy scenarios relative to the
competitive equilibrium. All thought experiments are performed according to the following principles.
We start from a competitive equilibrium without GDP-linked debt, with a given inherited debt level
and realized state of productivity at time t. Before t is realized, the outstanding debt is bought
back by the planner (or creditors in row 2 of Table 3) at the going market price so as to guarantee
that investors who bought the debt at time t   1 receive the expected repayment in period t (so in
expectation neither gains nor losses are accrued). Then, the planner calculates the expected utility
she can provide to the sovereign under the constraint that the expected prot for the planner is equal
to the cost of buying back the debt. We refer to this intervention as cost neutral.
The welfare gains are measured as the equivalent variation in terms of consumption. We also report
the equivalent variation in terms of debt, namely, the market value of a reduction in the initial debt
that keeps the borrower indi¤erent between staying in the competitive equilibrium (with the adjusted
debt) and moving to an alternative allocation.
In Table 3, we report the welfare gains of moving from the competitive (Markov) equilibrium
to counterfactual economies, starting from the stationary distribution of the competitive equilibrium
(columns 1-2) and from a recession with an initial debt-output ratio of b0=y0 = 100% (columns 3-4).
Note that, since R < 1, all economies except the rst best are stationary.
The welfare gains are generally large, especially when the economy is initially in a recession with
a large debt. Naturally, going to the rst best yields the largest gains (rst row). The gains are also
sizable in the planning economy with limited enforcement of Section 4 (third row): they amount to
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1.7% when evaluated (in expected value) at the stationary distribution, and to 3% in a recession with
a large debt. The equivalent debt reduction is also large. For instance, access to a contract with one-
sided commitment when e¤ort is observable delivers larger welfare gains than the outright cancellation
of the outstanding debt. Welfare gains are, as expected, increasing in risk aversion (details available
upon request).
The second row shows the value of access to GDP-linked debt. When evaluated at the stationary
distribution, the consumption-equivalent welfare e¤ect is 1%, or about 60% of the gains from the
planning allocation with one-sided commitment. However, the gains are smaller when the economy
starts in a recession with high debt, being less than a third of the welfare gains the planner can deliver
(third row). As discussed above, this illustrates that the trade-o¤ between moral hazard and insurance
limits the gains associated with the possibility to issue GDP-linked debt in a recession. The planner
can resolve this problem owing to her commitment to punish past deviations, hence the much larger
welfare gain.
The last row shows the value of moving to an Aiyagari economy with full commitment to honor
debt but no GDP-linked debt. The gains are three times larger than the planning allocation with
limited commitment. This conrms the importance of limited enforcement.
5.4.1 Decomposition exercise
To understand better the result, it is useful to decompose the welfare gains. We focus for simplicity
on the comparison between the rst best and the competitive equilibrium. The welfare gains can be
decomposed in three components:
1. Discounting: In the rst best, the planner can frontload consumption and backload e¤ort to
satisfy the representative agents impatience (recall that R < 1). In particular, consumption
falls to zero in the long run and e¤ort tends to the maximum level. This cannot happen in
the competitive equilibrium because the outside option shock (or, in the Aiyagari economy, the
precautionary motive) bounds consumption away from zero.
2. Volatility: In the rst best, there is no volatility of consumption or e¤ort around the trend. In
particular, shocks do not inuence consumption.
3. Level: The present value of consumption and e¤ort is di¤erent in the two economies.
The decomposition proceeds through the following steps. First, we construct a rst best bench-
mark using as initial condition the stationary distribution of wealth. More precisely, we take the
debt distribution associated with the competitive equilibrium of the calibrated economy, and calcu-
late for each debt level the corresponding cost-equivalent rst-best allocation. Then, we calculate a
pseudo-planner allocation with constant consumption and e¤ort. Namely, we calculate the present
value of consumption in the rst best and generate a constant consumption sequence with the same
present value. Moreover, we calculate the constant e¤ort level needed to sustain this allocation. The
discounting e¤ect is the welfare cost of going from the rst-best to the pseudo-planner allocation.
Next, we calculate level and volatility e¤ects, building on the decomposition proposed by Atkinson
(1970). This amounts to calculating the average consumption in the pseudo-planner allocation and
in each of the alternatives. In all cases, we calculate a constant e¤ort sequence that sustains the
associated consumption. The welfare cost (possibly negative) of going from the pseudo-planner to the
constant-consumption alternative is the level e¤ect. Finally, we calculate the welfare of having the
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Total Volatility Level Discounting
-5.5 -1.1 -0.4 -4.1
Table 4: Welfare decomposition: from rst best to competitive equilibrium
uctuations in consumption and reform e¤ort associated with each allocation, relative to the constant
sequences. We label this volatility e¤ect. In Appendix B we show that this decomposition is exact
when consumption is log normally distributed and in the absence of reform e¤ort.
The results of the decomposition are shown in Table 4. The discounting e¤ect is large and accounts
for 74% of the losses of going from the rst best to the competitive equilibrium. This result illustrates
that the ability to frontload consumption by overcoming the limited enforcement friction is very
important. The reduction in volatility also yields signicant welfare gains (20% of the total e¤ect),
while the level e¤ect is small. A similar comparison can be made between the rst best and the other
economies considered in Table 3 (omitted here).
5.5 Ruling out renegotiation
In this section, we consider an environment in which there is no possibility to renegotiate debt: the
sovereign can decide to either honor the debt or outright default. The purpose of this exercise is to
investigate how ruling out renegotiations will inuence welfare. In the economy with state-contingent
debt and no moral hazard we can provide a sharp result: ruling out renegotiations will always be
welfare reducing.31
In the general case, shutting down renegotiation has a number of negative implications. First
and foremost, there will be costly default in equilibrium. The real costs su¤ered by the sovereign
yields no benet to creditors, in contrast with the renegotiation scenario, where real costs are averted
and creditors recover a share of the face value of debt. Second, conditional on the debt level, the
range  for which the sovereign defaults is di¤erent across the two economies. More formally, in the
benchmark equilibrium of Section 3 the sovereign renegotiates if  < W (0; w)  W (b; w) whereas in
the no-renegotiation equilibrium she defaults if  < WNR (0; w) WNR (b; w), where WNR is the value
function under no renegotiation. As long asWNR is falling more steeply in b thanW , then, conditional
on the debt level, the sovereign is more likely to honor the debt in the benchmark equilibrium than
in the no-renegotiation equilibrium.
This is the case in our calibrated economy, as illustrated by Figure 7 in Appendix B. The gure
displays the renegotiation threshold functions (b; w) of the calibrated competitive equilibrium and
corresponding no-renegotiation scenario. The former are uniformly below the latter. Thus, for a given
debt level, debt is honored with a higher probability in the benchmark economy where renegotiation
is allowed. As foreign investors anticipate the larger risk of default and the larger haircuts (100%),
the price of debt is lower under no renegotiation, and this curtails the sovereigns ability to smooth
consumption. Moreover, the maximum debt level is lower in the no-renegotiation economy than in
the benchmark equilibrium (125% of normal-time GDP rather than 176%).
Panel a of Figure 6 plots the welfare losses associated with ruling out renegotiation as a function
of the initial debt level, starting from the benchmark economy. In particular, b0 is the initial face
value of debt in the benchmark economy. As in our earlier experiments, cost neutrality for the
31This result follows directly from Proposition 14 which shows that the competitive equilibrium allocation (in the
economy with renegotiation) is equivalent to the planner allocation.
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lenders is preserved by compensating initial debt holders for the change in the market value of the
outstanding debt. This is attained by increasing the face value of debt at time t before the shock t is
realized.32 For instance, for an economy in a recession with a 40% debt-to-GDP ratio the consumption
equivalent welfare loss of ruling out renegotiation amounts to 1.67% of permanent consumption. The
welfare losses are increasing in the initial debt level. The reason is that the set of states for which
renegotiation prevents costly default is larger when debt is large. Therefore, ruling out renegotiation
is especially costly when an economy is in a recession with high debt.
These results di¤er from the existing literature. For example, Yue (2010) and Hatchondo et al.
(2014) nd that ruling out renegotiation can be welfare improving in models without moral hazard.
Their models di¤er in a number of respects from ours. In particular, in both papers renegotiation is
costly, and the sovereign has bargaining power in the renegotiation game. Moreover, Hatchondo et al.
(2014) assume that the sovereign issues long-term debt.
5.6 Austerity cum Grexit
In this section, we evaluate the welfare consequences of an austerity program, where any violation
of the programs conditions triggers an immediate and permanent termination of the arrangement.
This scenario is reminiscent of the so-called Grexit threat that was supported by some Eurozone
leaders, most notably the German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, before the third bailout plan
for Greece was nally settled in July 2015.33
Consider a once-and-for-all intervention of an external institution (the Trojka) that provides a
guarantee on the sovereigns obligations, so that the market price of debt will be 1=R in all states.
The Trojka requires in exchange scal austerity, i.e., the sovereign can roll over the outstanding
debt, but cannot borrow additional resources on the market. E¤ort is observable, and the Trojka is
committed to terminate the assistance program (Grexit) as soon as the sovereign either attempts to
renegotiate the outstanding debt, or violates the scal austerity requirement. The abrupt termination
of the contract triggers default: the sovereign pays the cost  and renegotiates its outstanding debt.
Even in this case, the Trojka reimburses the investors for losses on the debt issued before default. In
case of no termination, the program continues until the recession ends. At that time the sovereign
repays its debt and start borrowing at market terms.
This program has some attractive features: (i) the international guarantee reduces the burden of
servicing debt; (ii) the intervention mitigates the hold-up problem in reform e¤ort. However, the scal
austerity requirement limits the possibility of borrowing to smooth consumption. Moreover, ine¢ cient
terminations can occur inducing losses for the Trojka and uctuations in consumption and e¤ort for
the sovereign.
Panel b of Figure 6 plots the welfare losses arising from the introduction of the austerity program
starting from a competitive equilibrium. When the program starts, the Trojka purchases the out-
standing debt at market value. Thereafter, it o¤ers the guarantee described above. Since a costly
termination may occur in equilibrium, the Trojka makes losses in expectations when entering the
32Note that for su¢ ciently high initial debt levels, this adjustment is not feasible because the benchmark debt value
exceeds the maximum debt revenue that can be raised under no renegotiation. This imposes an upper bound on initial
debt for which we can show the welfare losses associated with cost-neutral changes.
Alternatively, the welfare costs could be illustrated by keeping the utility of the sovereign constant and calculating the
associated expected prot losses for the lenders. This is shown in Panel a of Figure 8 in Appendix B.
33See, e.g., Spiegel online July 17, 2015, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/schaeuble-pushed-for-a-grexit-
and-backed-merkel-into-a-corner-a-1044259.html.
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Figure 6: Panel a plots the welfare losses of ruling out renegotiation, relative to remaining in the
benchmark economy. Panel b plots the welfare losses of imposing an Austerity cum Grexitpolicy,
relative to remaining in the benchmark economy.
agreement. Therefore, the initial debt of the sovereign must be increased in order for the intervention
to be cost neutral. Similar to the no-renegotiation case, there is an upper bound on initial debt, above
which it is not feasible to achieve cost neutral interventions (since the maximum debt revenue is lower
under Grexit). Therefore, the gure only displays welfare losses in the range below this upper bound.
In the plotted range, the welfare loss of Grexit is decreasing in the outstanding debt, ranging from
1.37% at zero debt to 0.33% at a debt 100% of GDP.34 Recall that in the benchmark economy the
moral hazard in reform e¤ort is increasing in debt. In the presence of a debt guarantee the price
of debt does not respond to the level of debt, in which case the moral hazard problem is mitigated.
Therefore, the higher the debt the smaller is the disadvantage of the Trojka guarantee. Note that we
could not prove that a Grexit-style austerity program is necessarily worse in welfare terms than the
benchmark competitive equilibrium. However, we have not been able to nd welfare gains for any
debt level or any risk aversion.
In summary, the two last sections establish that two institutional arrangements proposed in the
policy debate as instruments for allegedly improving ex-ante incentives commitment not to renego-
tiate and scal austerity may actually be ine¢ cient. In our calibrated economies both policies are
dominated in welfare terms by the laissez-faire equilibrium, and a fortiori by an assistance program
that allows repeated renegotiations, reminiscent of the de facto policy pursued by the Trojka.
6 Conclusions
This paper presents a theory of sovereign debt dynamics under limited commitment. A sovereign coun-
try issues debt to smooth consumption during a recession whose duration is uncertain and endogenous.
34Panel b of Figure 8 in Appendix B shows the expected prots net of the initial value of debt when keeping the utility
of the sovereign constant. There one can see that in a range of high debt levels the prot starts falling which implies
that the welfare loss associated with Grexit are in general non-monotonic.
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The expected duration of the recession depends on the intensity of (costly) structural reforms. Both
elements  the risk of repudiation and the need for structural reforms  are salient features of the
recent European debt crisis.
The competitive equilibrium, assumed to be Markovian, features recurrent debt renegotiations.
Renegotiations are more likely to occur during recessions and when the country has accumulated a
high level of debt. As a recession drags on, the country has an incentive to go deeper into debt. A
higher level of debt in turn may obstruct rather than encourage economic reforms.
The theory bears normative predictions that are relevant for events such as the European crisis.
The competitive equilibrium is ine¢ cient for two reasons. On the one hand, due to the lack of
commitment of market institutions, structural reforms are subject to a hold up problem. The intuitive
reason is that the short-run cost of reforms is borne entirely by the country, while future benets of
reforms accrue in part to the creditors in the form of an ex-post increased price of debt, due to a
reduction in the probability of renegotiation. On the other hand, the limited commitment to honor
debt induces high risk premia and excess consumption volatility. A well-designed intervention by an
international institution endowed with commitment power can improve welfare. The optimal policy
entails an assistance program whereby an international organization provides the country with a
constant transfer ow, deferring the repayment of debt to the time when the recession ends. The
optimal contract takes into account that this payment is itself subject to renegotiation risk.
The result that institutions endowed with commitment power can improve on the competitive
equilibrium hinges on reforms being observable, an assumption that is also maintained in the compet-
itive equilibrium. If institutions cannot observe reform (even imperfectly), institutional commitment
is powerless, and the assistance program cannot improve on the competitive equilibrium. Arguably,
in the recent debt crises, many reforms were by-and-large observable (e.g., labor market reforms, or
the establishment of a property registry in Greece), suggesting that commitment issues played an
important role.
A second implication is that, when the sovereign credibly threatens to renege on an existing
agreement, concessions should be made to avoid an outright repudiation. Contrary to a common
perception among policy makers, a rigid commitment to enforce the terms of the original agreement
is not optimal. Rather, the optimal policy entails the possibility of multiple renegotiations, which are
reected in the terms of the initial agreement. Likewise, we show that shutting down renegotiations
is not useful, and induces instead additional welfare losses.
To retain tractability, we make important assumptions that we plan to relax in future research.
First, in our theory the default cost follows an exogenous stochastic process. In a richer model, this
would be part of the equilibrium dynamics. Strategic delegation is a potentially important extension.
In the case of Greece, voters may have an incentive to elect a radical sovereign with the aim of
delegating the negotiation power to an agent that has or is perceived to have a lower default cost
than voters do (cf. Rogo¤ 1985). In our current model, however, the stochastic process governing the
creditors outside option is exogenous, and is outside of the control of the sovereign and creditors.
Second, again for simplicity, we assume that renegotiation is costless, that creditors can perfectly
coordinate and that they have full bargaining power in the renegotiation game. Each of these assump-
tions could be relaxed. For instance, in reality the process of negotiation may entail costs. Moreover,
as in the recent contention between Argentina and the so-called vulture funds, some creditors may hold
out and refuse to accept a restructuring plan signed by a syndicate of lenders. Finally, the country
may retain some bargaining power in the renegotiation. All these extensions would introduce interest-
ing additional dimensions, and invalidate some of the strong e¢ ciency results (for instance, the result
that the market economy attains the constrained optimum in the absence of income uctuations).
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However, we are condent that the gist of the results is robust to these extensions.
Finally, by focusing on a representative agent, we abstract from conicts of interest between
di¤erent groups of agents within the country. Studying the political economy of sovereign debt would
be an interesting extension. We leave the exploration of these and other avenues to future work.
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A Appendix A: Proofs of lemmas, propositions, and corollaries.
Proof of Proposition 1. Perfect insurance implies constant consumption (always) and e¤ort
(during recession). The e¢ cient solution maximizes the discounted utility, W = u (c) = (1  )  
X (p) = (1   (1  p)) with respect to c and p, subject to the following intertemporal budget constraint:
1
1   (1  p) (w   c) +

1  
p
1   (1  p) ( w   c) = b: (44)
Note that since insurance is provided in actuarially fair markets the budget constraint holds in expected
terms. Writing the Lagrangian, and di¤erentiating it with respect to c yields u0 (c) = : Di¤erentiating
the Lagrangian with respect to p; and simplifying terms, yields
X 0 (p)

1  

+ p

 X (p) = ( w   w) u0 (c) ; (45)
which is identical to Equation (1) in the text. Equation (44) denes a positively sloped locus in the
plane (p; c) ; while Equation (45) denes a negatively sloped locus in the same plane. Unless the
solution for e¤ort is a corner, the two equations pin down a unique interior solution for p and c.
Consider the comparative statics with respect to b (note that b only features in Equation (44)). An
increase in b yields a decrease in c and an increase in p. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 1. The rst part follows from the denitions of  and b^. For the second part, note
that  (b; w) = W (0; w) W (b; w) such that if W (b; w) is strictly decreasing in b, then  (b; w) must
be strictly increasing in b. Thus, the inverse function of  (b; w) exits and is given by the expressions
stated in Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. We prove that the value function W is a xed-point of a monotone
mapping following Stokey and Lucas (1989, Theorem 17.7).
Let  (w) be the space of bounded, continuous, and decreasing functions dened over [b;~b]. More-
over, let d1 denote the supremum norm such that ( ; d1) is a complete metric space. Let z 2  (w)
and  be a real constant representing the outside option under outright default. T (z; ) is similar to
the Bellman equation of the Markov equilibrium in the text, but di¤ers in that the value of outright
default in the recession state is exogenously given by    . We rst establish the existence of an
equilibrium for an exogenous ; and then extend the argument to an endogenous outside option as in
the Markov equilibrium.
I
Dene the following mapping:
T (z; ;w) (b) = max
b02[b;~b]
u(Q(b0; z; )b0   b+ w) + Z(b0; z; ; w); (46)
where  (x; z; ) =    z(x); and z

b^ (; z; )

=    : In addition, let T 0(z; ) = z, Tn(z; ) =
T (Tn 1(z; ); ), n = 1; 2; : : : , and zn  Tn(z; ). Moreover, when w = w,
Z(x; z; ; w) = E

max

z (x) ;    0	 ; and
Q(x; z; ; w)x = R 1E
h
min
n
x; b^(; z; )
oi
:
Correspondingly, when w = w
Z(x; z; ; w) =  X(	(x; z; )) + 

	(x; z; )E

max

W (x; w) ;W (0; w)  0	
+(1 	(x; z; ))E maxz (x) ;    0	

;
X 0(	(x; z; )) = 

[1  F ( (x; w))]W (x; w)
  [1  F ((x; z; ))] z(x)

;
Q(x; z; ; w)x = R 1E
24 	(x; z; ) minnx; b^ (; w)o
+(1 	(x; z; )) min
n
x; b^ (; z; )
o 35 :
Note that the mapping during recession, T (z; ;w) ; takes as given the existence of the equilibrium
functionsW (b; w) ;  (b; w) and b^ (; w) : This is legitimate because one can prove existence recursively,
rst for normal times and then in recession.
We dene upper and lower bounds for the value functions. More formally, WMIN  u(w)=(1  
)   max, and WMAX  u( w)=(1   ). It is straightforward to see that WMIN and WMAX are,
respectively, lower and upper bounds to the present utility the country can attain in equilibrium.
We establish rst that the operator T (z; ;w) (b) is a uniformly continuous, bounded and decreas-
ing (in b) mapping of the function space   into itself. Continuity follows by the Theorem of the
Maximum. Boundedness follows from the fact that utility is bounded because consumption, reform
e¤ort, the support of the default cost, and the elements of   are bounded. Finally, to establish that
the mapping T is decreasing in b note that, for any  > 0; T (z; ;w) (b+ ) < T (z; ;w) (b) since
T (z; ;w) (b+ ) = max
b02[b;~b]
u
 
Q(b0; z; ; w)b0 + w   (b+ )+ Z  b0; z; ; w
= u (Q(B (b+ ; z; ; w) ; z; ; w) B (b+ ; z; ; w) + w   (b+ )) + Z (B (b+ ; z; ; w) ; z; ; w)
< u (Q (B (b+ ; z; ; w) ; z; ; w) B (b+ ; z; ; w) + w   b) + Z (B (b+ ; z; ; w) ; z; ; w)
 u (Q (B (b; z; ; w) ; z; ; w) B (b; z; ; w) + w   b) + Z (B (b; z; ; w) ; z; ; w) = T (z; ;w) (b) ;
where B(b; z; ; w) = arg maxb02[b;~b] u(Q(b
0; z; ; w)b0   b+ w) + Z(b0; z; ; w):
Next, we establish that the mapping T (z; ;w) is monotone in z, that its xed-point z (z; ;w) (b) =
limn!+1 Tn (z; ;w) (b) exists, and that z 2  . To this aim, consider z; z+ 2   with z (b) < z+ (b),
8b 2 [b;~b]. Since z and z+ are decreasing in b; implying that z+

b^(; z+; )

=   > z

b^(; z+; )

,
it follows immediately that b^(; z; ) < b^(; z+; ). Consequently,  (b; z; )   (b; z+; ) for all
II
b 2 [b;~b], which in turn implies that Q(b; z; ; w)  Q(b; z+; ; w). Consider rst the case of w = w:
We establish that z+ > z , T (z+; ; w) (b) > T (z; ; w) (b) ; since
T
 
z+; ; w

(b) = max
b02[b;~b]
u
 
Q(b0; z+; ; w)b0   b+ w+ Z  b0; z+; ; w
= u
 
Q(B
 
b; z+; ; w

; z+; ; w) B  b; z+; ; w  b+ w+ Z  B  b; z+; ; w ; z+; ; w
 u  Q(B (b; z; ; w) ; z+; ; w) B (b; z; ; w)  b+ w+ Z  B (b; z; ; w) ; z+; ; w
> u (Q(B (b; z; ; w) ; z; ; w) B (b; z; ; w)  b+ w) + Z (B (b; z; ; w) ; z; ; w)
= max
b02[b;~b]
u(Q
 
b0; z; ; w

b0 + w   b) + Z  b0; z; ; w = T (z; ; w) (b) :
where the rst inequality follows from the fact that B (b; z; ; w) yields a lower utility relative to the
optimal B (b; z+; ; w). The second inequality follows from the fact that Q (b; z; ; w)  Q (b; z+; ; w)
for all b 2 [b;~b].
Consider, next, the case of w = w: Let E V (b)  E [V (b; ; w)] : We establish that z+ > z ,
T (z+; ;w) (b) > T (z; ;w) (b) ; since
T
 
z+; ;w

(b) = max
b02[b;~b]
u
 
Q(b0; z+; )b0   b+ w+ Z  b0; z+; 
= u
 
Q(B
 
b; z+; 

; z+; ) B  b; z+;   b+ w X  	  B  b; z+;  ; z+; 
+

	 (B (b; z+; ) ; z+; )E V (B (b; z+; )) +
(1 	 (B (b; z+; ) ; z+; ))E [max f   ; z+ (B (b; z+; ))g]

 u  Q(B (b; z; ) ; z+; ) B (b; z; )  b+ w X (	 (B (b; z; ) ; z; ))
+

	 (B (b; z; ) ; z; )E V (B (b; z; )) +
(1 	 (B (b; z; ) ; z; ))E [max f   ; z+ (B (b; z; ))g]

> u (Q (B (b; z; ) ; z; ) B (b; z; )  b+ w) X (	 (B (b; z; ) ; z; ))
+

	 (B (b; z; ) ; z; )E V (B (b; z; )) +
(1 	 (B (b; z; ) ; z; ))E [max f   ; z (B (b; z; ))g]

= max
b02[b;~b]
u(Q(b0; z; )b0   b+ w) + Z(b0; z; ) = T (z; ) (b; w) ;
where the same logic as above applies.
We have established that T (z; ;w) is a monotone mapping with the sup norm. This mapping is
an equicontinuous family (each function in   is uniformly continuous and the continuity is uniform
for all functions in  ). Then, Stokey and Lucas (1989, Theorem 17.7) ensures that the xed point of
T (z; ;w) exists, is an element of   and is given by z(z; ;w) = limn!+1 Tn(z; ;w).
Thus far, we have proven the existence of at least one xed point of the mapping T for any
exogenous outside option,  2 [WMIN ;WMAX ] : We now use a di¤erent xed point argument to
show that, conditional on an initial z; there exists a unique xed point that the outside options
in normal times and recession are, respectively, z ( w) and z (w) with the following properties:
z (z; z ( w) ; w) (0) = z ( w) = WMAX and z (z; z (w) ; w) (0) = z (w) 2 (WMIN ;WMAX) : To
see why, note that, by the Theorem of the Maximum, z (z; ;w) (b) = limn!+1 Tn (z; ;w) (b) is
continuous in . Moreover, z is bounded since z (z; ;w) 2 [WMIN ;WMAX ]. Thus, the Brouwer
xed-point theorem ensures that there exists a z 2 [WMIN ;WMAX ] such that z (z; z; w) (0) =
z. Since z
 (z; z; w) (0) = z    (0; z; z), this is equivalent to say that, at each xed point,
III
 (0; z; z (w)) = 0: To prove uniqueness, we note then that 
 
0; z ; 

is monotone increasing
for all  2 [WMIN ;WMAX ] ; as the set of (potential) states of nature in which the outside option
is attractive expands when  increases. Therefore, there exists a unique xed point z (w) such
that  (0; z; z (w)) = 0. In particular in normal times z ( w) = W (0; w) = WMAX : In recession,
z (w) = W (0; w) 2 (WMIN ;WMAX).
The results proven thus far allow us to claim the existence of an equilibrium value function W
such that W (b; w) = T (W ;W (0; w) ; w) (b) : The denition of the remaining equilibrium functions
follow from Denition 1. This establishes the existence of a Markov equilibrium. The continuity of
the value function W (b; w) in b follows from the Theorem of the Maximum, and implies that also
the equilibrium functions ; Q and 	 are continuous in b: It is also straightforward to show that W
is strictly decreasing in b and, hence, that  (b; w) = W (0; w)  W (b; w) is strictly increasing in b:
Finally, we claim that the bond revenue, Q(b0; w)b0, is (weakly) monotone increasing in b0: This follows
from Equations (6)(8), the fact that  increasing in b; and from Lemma 1.
Next, we prove that B is monotone decreasing in b by applying TopkisTheorem: To this aim,
dene B(b; w) = arg maxb02[b;~b]O(b
0; b; w) where
O(b0; b; w) = u(Q(b0; w)b0   b+ w) + Z(b0; w): (47)
We rst establish that the objective function O(b0; b; w) is supermodular in (b0; b), i.e., if b0H > b
0
L and
bH > bL, then, O(b0H ; bH ; w) O(b0L; bH ; w)  O(b0H ; bL; w) O(b0L; bL; w). To this aim, note that
u(Q(b0H ; w)b
0
H   bH + w)  u(Q(b0L; w)b0L   bH + w) (48)
 u(Q(b0H ; w)b0H   bL + w)  u(Q(b0L; w)b0L   bL + w):
This inequality follows from the concavity of the utility function and the fact thatQ (b; w) b is increasing
with b; implying that, for  > 0;
u0(Q(x;w)x  b+ w)  u0(Q(x+ ; w) (x+ )  b+ w)  0:
Rearranging terms in (48), and adding and subtracting continuation values on both sides of the
inequality yields
u(Q(b0H ; w)b
0
H   bH + w)  u(Q(b0H ; w)b0H   bL + w)
+Z(b0H ; w)  Z(b0H ; w)
 u(Q(b0L; w)b0L   bH + w)  u(Q(b0L; w)b0L   bL + w)
+Z(b0L; w)  Z(b0L; w)
that is equivalent to O(b0H ; bH ; w) O(b0H ; bL; w)  O(b0L; bH ; w) O(b0L; bL; w): This establishes that
O(b0; b; w) is supermodular in (b0; b): TopkisTheorem implies then that B(bH ; w)  B(bL; w). This
concludes the proof of Proposition 2.
Corollary 1 Let the operator T be dened as in Equation (46). If, for w 2 fw; wg; W (b; w) =
limn!1 Tn (WMIN ;W (b; w) ; w) (b) = limn!1 Tn (WMAX ;W (b; w) ; w) (b), then the Markov equilib-
rium is unique (i.e., there exists a unique equilibrium value function W (b; w) satisfying Denition
1).
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Proof of Corollary 1. The proof follows immediately from the Corollary to Theorem 17.7 in Stokey
and Lucas (1989).
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof is an application of the generalized envelope theorem in Clausen
and Strub (2013) which allows for discrete choices (i.e., repayment or renegotiation) and non-concave
value functions. Consider the programW (b; w) = maxb02[b;~b]O(b
0; b; w) where O is dened in Equation
(47). Theorem 1 in Clausen and Strub (2013) ensures that if we can nd a di¤erentiable lower support
function (DLSF) for O; then O is di¤erentiable for all b0 2 B(w):
We start by proving the lemma for the case of w = w. The strategy of the proof involves nding
DLSF for the equilibrium functions Q(b0; w)b0 and Z(b0; w). To this aim, we follow the strategy of
Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979), and consider the value function of a pseudo-borrower that chooses
debt issuance b0 = B (x;w) instead of the optimal b0 = B (b; w),
fW (b; x; w)  u (Q (B (x;w) ; w)B (x;w)  b+ w) + Z (B (x;w) ; w) :
Note that fW is di¤erentiable and strictly decreasing in b: Since debt issuance is chosen suboptimally,
it must be the case that fW (b; x; w)  W (b; w) with equality holding at x = b. Furthermore, let
the pseudo-borrower set the default threshold at the level e (b; x; w) = W (0; w)  fW (b; x; w), wheree (b; x; w)   (b; w). Thus, the pseudo-borrower will nd it optimal to renegotiate for a range of 
larger than (b; w). Note that e (b; x; w) is di¤erentiable and strictly increasing in b: Thus, the inverse
function exists and is such that e 1x;w ()  b^(;w) (where we dene ex;w (b)  e (b; x; w)).
Consider rst the case in which w = w. Let
eO  b0; b; x; w = u eQ(b0; x; w)b0   b+ w+ eZ(b0; x; w);
where the pseudo bond revenue function is given by
eQ  b0; x; w b0 = 1
R
e	(b0; x) h1  F (e  b0; x; w)i b0 + Z e(b0; w)
0
e 1x; w()dF ()
!
+
1
R
(1  e	(b0; x)) h1  F (e  b0; x; wi b0 + Z e(b0;w)
0
e 1x;w()dF ()
!
;
and the continuation value is given by
eZ(b0; x; w) =  X(e	(b0; x)) + 
24 e	(b0; x)EmaxnfW (b0; x; w) ;fW (0; x; w)  0o
+(1  e	(b0; x))EmaxnfW (b0; x; w) ;fW (0; x; w)  0o
35 ;
having dened e	 as
e	(b0; x) =  X 0 1
0@
24 EmaxnfW (b0; x; w);fW (0; x; w)  0o
 Emax
nfW (b0; x; w);fW (0; x; w)  0o
351A :
Note that eQ; eZ and e	 are di¤erentiable in b0 since we established above thatfW and e are di¤erentiable.
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Then, eO is a DLSF for O such that eO(b0; b; x; w)  O(b0; b; w) with equality (only) at b0 = x. Thus,
Theorem 1 in Clausen and Strub (2013) ensures that the objective function O (b0; b; w) is di¤erentiable
in b0 at b0 = B (b; w) and that @O(b0; b; w)=@b0 = @ eO(b0; b; B (b; w) ; w)=@b0 = 0. In this case, a standard
rst-order condition yields
@u (Q(b0; w)b0   b+ w)
@b0
+
@Z(b0; w)
@b0
= 0:
Moreover, Lemma 3 in Clausen and Strub (2013) ensures that the functions W (b; w), Z(b; w),
(b; w), Q(b; w), and 	(b) are di¤erentiable and that a standard envelope condition applies, namely,
@Z(b0; w)
@b0
= 
"
	(b0) [1  F ((b0; w))] @W (b0; w)@b0
+(1 	(b0)) [1  F ((b0; w))] @W (b0;w)@b0
#
;
@W (b; w)
@b
=  u0 (Q(B(b; w); w)B(b; w)  b+ w) < 0:
The proof for the case of w = w follows the same strategy and is therefore omitted.
Proof of Lemma 2. In normal times, the bond revenue function can be written as
Q(b0; w)b0 = R 1Emin
n
b0; b^(; w)
o
.
Note that the minimum function in the expectation operator is concave in b0. Since the sum of concave
functions is still concave, then also E
n
min b0; b^(; w)
o
must be concave in b0. This implies that the
marginal bond revenue is falling in b0. Di¤erentiating Q(b0; w)b0 with respect to b0 2 [b;~b] yields:
@ (Q(b0; w)b0)
@b0
= Q
 
b0; w

+
@
@b0
 
R 1
 
1  F    b0+ (Rb0) 1 Z (b0)
0
 1 () f () d
!
 b0
= Q
 
b0; w
 R 1b0f    b0 @  (b0)
@b0
+b0(Rb0) 1  1
 

 
b0

f
 

 
b0

@
 (b0)
@b0
  1
R
1
b0
Z (b0)
0
 
 1 () f () d| {z }
=Q(b0; w)  1
R(1 F((b0)))
= R 1
 
1  F    b0 :
Proof of Proposition 4. The rst-order condition of (10) for w = w yields:
@
@b0

b0 Q  b0; w	 u0 (c) + @
@b0
EV
 
b0; w

= 0;
The function V has a kink at b0 = b^ (; w) : Consider, rst, the range of realizations  >  (b) implying
that b0 < b^ (; w). Di¤erentiating V in this range yields:
@
@b
V (b; ; w) =  u0 [Q (B (b; w) ; w)B (b; w) + w   b] :
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Next, consider the region of renegotiation,  <  (b) ; implying that b > b^ (; w) : In this case,
@
@bV (b; ; w) = 0. Using the results above one obtains:
@
@b
EV (b; w) =
Z (b)
0
@
@b
V (b; ; w) dF () +
Z 1
(b)
@
@b
V (b; ; w) dF ()
=  
Z 1
(b)
u0 [Q (B (b; w) ; w)B (b; w) + w   b] dF ()
=   1  F   (b) u0 [Q (B (b; w) ; w)B (b; w) + w   b] (49)
Plugging this expression back into the FOC, and leading the expression by one period, yields
0 =
@
@b0

b0 Q  b0; w	 u0 (c)   1  F    b0 u0  c0jH; w :
Finally, recall that @@b fbQ (b; w)g = 1R
 
1  F   (b) ; as established in the proof of Lemma 2.
Thus, for F
 
 (b)

< 1; the above equation is equivalent to the CEE (13) in the proposition.
Although the rst-order condition is also satised at b0 = b; it is possible to show that this is never
an optimal solution as long as b < b (details in Appendix B).
Consider, next, the properties of the equilibrium functions C and W: Using the denition of C
in Equation (11) and Lemma 2, standard algebra shows that C is continuously di¤erentiable and de-
creasing, with derivative @C(b; w)=@b = R 1

1  F ( (b))   1 < 0: Since B(b; w) = b; then B maps
the complete domain of b into itself, B( w) = [b;b]. Proposition 3 implies then that the value function
is di¤erentiable everywhere, and that the envelope condition @W (b; w)=@b =  u0(C(b; w)) applies.
Di¤erentiating this condition with respect to b yields @2W (b; w)= (@b)2 =  u00(C(b; w))@C(b; w)=@b =
u00(C(b; w))

1 R 1 1  F ( (b)) < 0: This establishes that the value function W is twice contin-
uously di¤erentiable and strictly concave, thereby concluding the proof of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 5. We start by claiming that cFB (b; w) > C (b; w), where cFB (b; w) was
dened in Proposition 1 and C (b; w) denotes consumption in the market equilibrium when debt is
honored. To see why, note that @=@b

WFB (b; w)
	  @=@b fW (b; w)g. This follows from observing
that the di¤erence between WFB (b; w) and WFB (b+ ; w) ; where  > 0; merely reects the utility
loss from a permanent reduction in consumption cFB (b; w) and (in recession) a permanent increase
in e¤ort pFB (b). In contrast, in the market equilibrium a larger debt induces a higher volatility of
consumption (recall that  (b; w) is monotone increasing in b see Lemma 1 so higher debt increases
the probability of renegotiation) and (in recession) e¤ort. Since @=@b

WFB (b; w)
	
=  u0  cFB (b; w)
and @=@b fW (b; w)g =  u0 (C (b; w)) ; then the claim that cFB (b; w) > C (b; w) follows.
Let min  [u ( w)  u ((1  ) ( w   w))] = (1  ) and bPV  w + 1  w. The assumption in the
Proposition implies that F (min) = 0 and bPV < w: Consider rst the range b  bPV : In this range,
W (b; w) = WFB (b; w) : To see this, note that W (bPV ; w) = u ( w   (1  ) bPV ) = (1  ) = min:
Since by assumption F (min) = 0, no renegotiation is possible for b  bPV , so the claim follows. The
two claims above and Proposition 1 imply that C (b; w) = cFB (b; w) > cFB (b; w)  C (b; w) in the
range b  bPV : Consider next the range b 2 (bPV ;b]: In this range, C (b; w)  0 since debt exceeds the
maximum present value of future income. In contrast, C (b; w) > 0 since bPV < w: We have therefore
established that C (b; w) > C (b; w) for all b  b:
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Proof of Lemma 3. If in the initial period (but not later) the country can contract on e¤ort while
issuing new debt, the problem becomes
max
b0;p

u (c) X (p) + p  EV  b0; w+  (1  p) EV  b0; w	 :
Note that the next-period value function V is the same as in the benchmark problem with non-
contractible e¤ort, since we are considering a one-period deviation. The rst-order condition with
respect to p yields
0 =
d
dp

Q
 
b0; w

b0
	 u0 (c) X 0 (p) +   EV  b0; w  EV  b0; w
) X 0 (p) =
h
Q
 
b0; w
  Q^  b0; wi b0  u0 (c)
+
Z 1
0
V
 
b0; 0; w

dF () 
Z 1
0
V
 
b0; 0; w

dF ()

> 
Z 1
0
V
 
b0; 0; w

dF () 
Z 1
0
V
 
b0; 0; w

dF ()

; (50)
where the last equation follows from the facts that Q (b0; w) > Q^ (b0; w) ; and that
d
dp

Q
 
b0; w

b0
	
=
d
dp
nh
pQ
 
b0; w

+ (1  p) Q^  b0; wi b0o
=
h
Q
 
b0; w
  Q^  b0; wi b0:
The right-hand side of the inequality in Equation (50) is the optimal e¤ort in the benchmark case
with non-contractible e¤ort, given in Equation (14). This establishes the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 6. Consider, rst, the range b 2 [0; b1). Di¤erentiate Equation (14) with
respect to b0,
X
00  
	
 
b0

	0
 
b0

= 
Z 1
0
@
@b0
V
 
b0; 0; w

dF () 
Z 1
0
@
@b0
V
 
b0; 0; w

dF ()

=   1  F    b0 u0 Q  B  b0; w ; wB  b0; w+ w   b0 (51)
+

1  F    b0 Q  B  b0; wB  b0; w+ w   b0
Taking the limit of Equation (51) as b0 ! 0 yields
X
00
(	 (0)) 	0 (0) =  [1  F ( (0))] [Q (B (0; w))B (0; w) + w   0]
  1  F   (0) u0 [Q (B (0; w) ; w)B (0; w) + w   0]
= 

u0 (Q (B (0; w))B (0; w) + w   0)  u0 ( w) > 0; (52)
where the last equation uses the facts that  (0) =  (0) = F (0) = 0 and that during normal times
c = w if b = 0. Note that during recession, the annualized present value of income is strictly smaller
than w. Therefore, it can never be optimal to choose consumption during recession larger than or
equal to w when b = 0. Since the marginal utility of consumption is larger in a recession than
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during normal times, the right-hand side of Equation (52) is strictly positive. Since X 00 > 0, then
limb!0 	0 (b) = 	0 (0) > 0. By continuity, it follows then that 	0 (b) will be positive for a range of b
close to b = 0, so there must exist a b1 > 0 such that 	0 (b) > 0 for all b 2 [0; b1).
Consider, next, the range b 2 b ;b, in which case F ( (b)) = 1 and F   (b) < 1. This implies that
Equation (51) can be written as
X
00
(	 (b)) 	0 (b) =   1  F   (b) u0 [Q (B (b; w) ; w)B (b; w) + w   b] < 0;
which establishes that 	0 (b) < 0 for all b 2 b ;b and with strict inequality also for b = b . By
continuity, it follows then that there exists a b2 < b  such that 	0 (b) < 0 for all b 2
 
b2;b

. Finally,
in the range where b  b, F ( (b)) = F   (b) = 1 so the right-hand side of Equation (51) becomes
zero, implying that 	0 (b) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 7. The procedure is analogous to the derivation of the CEE in normal times.
The rst-order condition of (10) for w = w yields
0 =
d
db0

Q
 
b0; w
 b0	 u0 (c) +  1 	  b0 d
db0
EV
 
b0; w

+ 	
 
b0
 d
db0
EV
 
b0; w

;
where a term has been cancelled by the envelope theorem. Using the same argument as in the proof
of Proposition 4 we can write:
d
db
EV (b; w) =   [1  F ( (b))] u0 [Q (B (b; w) ; w)B (b; w) + w   b] :
Plugging this back into the FOC (after leading the expression by one period) yields the CEE
0 = u0 (c)
n
	0
 
b0
R hQ  b0; w  Q^  b0; wi b0+
+ 	
 
b0
  1  F    b0+ 1 	  b0  1  F    b0	
 R  1 	  b0 1  F    b0u0  c0jH;w+ 	  b0 1  F    b0u0  c0jH; w ;
where the equality follows from Lemma 4. Rearranging terms yields Equation (16).
Proof of Lemma 4. Di¤erentiating the bond revenue with respect to b yields
d
db
fQ (b; w) bg = d
db
n
pbQ (b; w) + (1  p) bQ^ (b; w)
o
+ 	0 (b)

Q (b; w)  Q^ (b; w)

b
= 	 (b) 1
R
 
1  F   (b)+ (1 	 (b)) 1
R
(1  F ( (b))) (53)
+	0 (b)

Q (b; w)  Q^ (b; w)

b;
where the second equality can be derived as following:
d
db
n
pbQ (b; w) + (1  p) bQ^ (b; w)
o
= p
1
R
 
1  F   (b)+ (1  p) Q^ (b; w)
+ (1  p)
"
  bRf ( (b)) 0 (b) 
1
R
1
b
R (b)
0
 
 1 () f () d+ 1Rbf ( (b)) 0 (b)
#
= p
1
R
 
1  F   (b)+ (1  p) 1
R
(1  F ( (b)))
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Consider, rst, the case in which 	 (b) is constant, 	 (b) = p: In this case, debt revenue is increasing
for all b < b; since, then, p=R 1  F   (b)+(1  p) =R(1  F ( (b))) > 0. Moreover, it reaches
a maximum at b = b (recall that F
 
 (b)

< F ( (b)) for all b < b). This establishes that, if 	 is
constant, then bR = b:
Consider, next, the general case. Proposition 6 implies that, in the range where b 2 [b2;b]; 	0 (b) <
0: Since Q (b; w) > Q^ (b; w), then, in a left neighborhood of b; 	0 (b)
h
Q (b; w)  Q^ (b; w)
i
b < 0: This
means that, starting from b; one can increase the debt revenue by reducing debt, i.e., bR < b:
Proof of Proposition 8. We proceed in two steps: rst, we derive the CEEs (step A), and then
we show that 
 
b0w; b0w

> 0 (step B).
Step A: The rst-order conditions with respect to b0w and b0w in problem (18) yields
0 = u0 (c) d
db0w
REV
 
b0w; b
0
w

+ 	
 
b0w; b
0
w
 d
db0w
EV
 
b0w; w

;
0 = u0 (c) d
db0w
REV
 
b0w; b
0
w

+ 

1 	  b0w; b0w ddb0wEV  b0w; w ;
where REV
 
b0w; b0w
  b0wQw  b0w; b0w+ b0wQ w  b0w; b0w is the bond revenue and c is dened in the
Proposition. Note that both equations have been simplied using an envelope condition. The value
function has a kink at b = b^ (;w) : Consider, rst, the range of realizations  2 [ (b) ;+1) ; implying
that b < b^ (;w). Di¤erentiating the value function yields:
d
db
V (b; ; w) =  u0 [Q (B (b; w) ; w)B (b; w) + w   b] ;
d
db
V (b; ; w) =  u0 Qw  Bw (b) ; B w (b)Bw (b) +Q w  Bw (b) ; B w (b)B w (b) + w   b ;
where Bw and B w denote the optimal issuance of the two assets, respectively. Next, consider the range
of realizations  <  (b) ; implying that b  b^ (;w). In this case, ddbV (b; ; w) = 0.
In analogy with Equation (49), we obtain:
d
db
EV (b; w) =   [1  F ( (b))] u0  cjH;w : (54)
Plugging (49) and (54) into the respective rst-order conditions, and leading by one period, yields
u0 (c) d
db0w
REV
 
b0w; b
0
w

= 	
 
b0w; b
0
w
 1  F    b0w u0  c0jH; w ;
u0 (c) d
db0w
REV
 
b0w; b
0
w

= 

1 	  b0w; b0w 1  F    b0w u0  c0jH;w :
The marginal revenues from issuing recession-contingent debt is given by:
d
db0w
REV
 
b0w; b
0
w

=
1 	  b0w; b0w
R
 
1  F    b0w 
@	(b0w;b0w)
@b0w
1 	  b0w; b0wQw  b0w; b0w b0w + b0w  @@b0wQ w  b0w; b0w
=
1 	  b0w; b0w
R
 
1  F    b0w+ @	  b0w; b0w@b0w   b0w; b0w ; (55)
X
where, note, @@b0wQ w
 
b0w; b0w

=
@	(b0w;b0w)
@b0w
Q w(b0w;b0w)
	(b0w;b0w)
follows from applying standard di¤erentiation to the
denition of Q w
 
b0w; b0w

in Equation (21). Applying the same methodology to the recovery-contingent
debt, we obtain:
d
db0w
REV
 
b0w; b
0
w

=
	
 
b0w; b0w

R
 
1  F    b0w+ @	  b0w; b0w@b0w   b0w; b0w :
The CEEs conditional on the recession continuing and ending, respectively, are then:

u0
 
c0jH;w

u0 (c)
=
1
R
+
@
@b0w
	
 
b0w; b
0
w
   b0w; b0w 
1  F    b0w 1 	  b0w; b0w

u0 (c0jH; w)
u0 (c)
=
1
R
+
@
@b0w
	
 
b0w; b
0
w
   b0w; b0w 
1  F   (b0w)	  b0w; b0w :
Setting R = 1 yields Equations (22)-(23).
Step B: Next, we prove that, in equilibrium, 
 
b0w; b0w

> 0. To prove the claim, it is useful to
dene the two functions
 w
 
b0w
  Q w  b0w; b0w b0w
	
 
b0w; b0w
 = 1
R
  
1  F    b0w b0w + Z (b0w)
0
 1 () f () d
!
;
w
 
b0w
  Qw  b0w; b0w b0w
1 	  b0w; b0w = 1R
  
1  F    b0w b0w + Z (b0w)
0
 1 () f () d
!
;
where, recall,  (x) >  (x) and F ( (x)) > F
 
 (x)

. Note that 
 
b0w; b0w

=  w (b
0
w)   w
 
b0w

;
where both  w and w are increasing functions in the relevant range, i.e., b0w  b and b0w  b. We
proceed in two steps. First, we show that 
 
b0w; b0w
  0 ) b0w > b0w (step B1). Next, we show that
b0w > b0w ) 
 
b0w; b0w

> 0 (step B2). Steps B1 and B2 establish jointly a contradiction ruling out
that 
 
b0w; b0w
  0 (step B3).
Step B1: Suppose that 
 
b0w; b0w
  0. Then, the CEEs (22)(23) and the assumption that
u00 < 0, imply that
c0jH; w  c  c0jH;w: (56)
Suppose, to derive a contradiction, that b0w  b0w. Recall that, if the recession ends and debt is honored,
debt remains constant, i.e., b
00
= B (b0w) = b0w. Moreover, Q (b0w; w) = Q w
 
b0w; b0w

=	
 
b0w; b0w

. Thus,
c0jH; w = Q (b0w; w) b0w + w   b0w =  w (b0w) + w   b0w.
c0jH; w = 	
 
b0w; b
0
w

 w
 
b0w

+
 
1 	  b0w; b0w  w  b0w+ w   b0w
 	  b0w; b0w  w  b0w+  1 	  b0w; b0w  w  b0w+ w   b0w
 	  b0w; b0w  w  b0w+  1 	  b0w; b0w w  b0w+ w   b0w
> 	
 
b0w; b
0
w

 w
 
b0w

+
 
1 	  b0w; b0w w  b0w+ w   b0w = c0jH;w:
The rst inequality follows from the assumption that b0w  b0w and the fact that (1  p)  w (x) x < 0 for
any p 2 [0; 1], which is due to the fact that  w (x)  x=R < x for any x. The second inequality follows
from the fact that  w
 
b0w
  w  b0w, see Equation (57) below. The last inequality follows from the
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maintained assumption that w > w. We have therefore proven that if b0w  b0w then c0jH; w > c0jH;w,
which contradicts (56) and, hence, implies that 
 
b0w; b0w
  0. We conclude from Step B1 that

 
b0w; b0w
  0) b0w > b0w.
Step B2: Suppose that b0w = b0w = x: Then, for any x:
 (x; x) =  w (x)  w (x) = 1
R
Z (x)
(x)
  
x   1 () f () d| {z }
>0
(57)
+
1
R
Z (x)
0
  
 1 ()   1 () f () d| {z }
>0
> 0:
Since  w (x) is an increasing function for x  b, Equation (57) implies that  w (b0w) > w
 
b0w

, for all
b0w < b0w  b. We conclude from Step B2 that b0w > b0w ) 
 
b0w; b0w

> 0.
Step B3: Putting together the conclusions of Step B1 and Step B2, we derive a contradiction:

 
b0w; b0w
  0) b0w > b0w )   b0w; b0w > 0. Therefore, we must have that   b0w; b0w > 0:
Proof of Proposition 9. We write the Lagrangian,
 =
Z
@

w   c + 1
R
P (!)

dF () + 
Z
@
[u (c) + !] dF ()  

+
Z
@
 [u (c) + !  W (0; w) + ] d;
with the associated multipliers  and . The rst-order conditions yield
f () = u0 (c)
 
f () + 

; (58)
f () + 

R =   P 0 (!) f () : (59)
The envelope condition yields
  P 0 () =  (60)
The two rst-order conditions, the envelope condition and R = 1 jointly imply that
u0 (c) =   1P 0 (!)
(61)
P 0 (!) = P 0 () 

f ()
: (62)
Note that (61) is equivalent to (28) in the text. Consider, next, two cases, namely, when the PC is
binding and when it is not binding.
When the PC is binding,  > 0: (62) implies then that ! > : Then, (61) and (29) determine
jointly the solution for (c; !) : When the PC is not binding,  = 0: (62) implies then that ! = 
and c = c () :
What remains to be shown is that the rst-order conditions are su¢ cient. The proof follows
Thomas and Worrall (1990, Proof of Proposition 1). The details of this proof are in Proposition 16 in
Appendix B.
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Proof of Lemma 5. The Lagrangian of the planners problem reads as
 =
Z
@

w   c +
1
R
 
(1  p)P
 
!

+ p P (!)

dF ()
+
Z
@
 
u
 
c
 X (p) +   (1  p)! + p! dF ()  
+
Z
@

 
u
 
c
 X (p) +   (1  p)! + p!   +  d
+
Z
@

  X (p) +   (1  p)! + p!  dev d;
where the Lagrange multipliers of the PC and IC must be non-negative for all ,   0;   0. The
rst-order conditions in combination with R = 1 yield:
f () = u0
 
c
  
 f () + 

; (63)
 f () +  +  =  P 0
 
!

f () ; (64)
 f () +  +  =   P 0 (!) f () ; (65)
R 1
 
P (!)  P
 
!

f () =
 
 f () +  + 
  
X 0 (p)  
 
!   !

; (66)
while the envelope condition yields
 P 0 () = : (67)
The rst-order conditions (64)(66) imply Equations (34)-(35) in the text. Since P and P are
monotonic and strictly concave, Equation (34) implies a strictly positive relationship between ! and
!. Equation (35) yields then a strictly negative relationship between p and !, and a strictly
increasing relationship between p and !. Consider, next, the IC constraint. Therefore, when the IC
is binding, the binding constraint (33), (34), and (35) pin down a unique solution for p; ! and !;
denoted by (p; !; !).
Proof of Proposition 10. We start by showing that   ! implies that the IC is never strictly
binding. Combine Equations (64) and (67) to yield P 0 ()  P 0  !. Since P is strictly concave this
implies that promised utility is non-decreasing, !  , conditional on staying in recession. Moreover,
!    !, thus the IC is never strictly binding,  = 0. When  = 0, the FOCs in (64)(66) read
u0
 
c

=   1
P 0
 
!

P 0
 
!

= P 0 ()  
f ()
P 0
 
!

= P 0 (!)
X 0 (p) = u0 (c)R 1
 
P (!)  P
 
!

+ 
 
!   !

:
The solution will therefore depend on whether the PC is slack or binding:
1. When the PC is binding and the recession continues,  < ~(),  > 0, ! > , and
u
 
c
 X (p) +   (1  p)! + p! = W (0; w)  : (68)
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Then, (34), (35), (36) and (68) determine jointly the solution for
 
c; p; !; !

. In this case,
there is no history dependence, i.e.,  does not matter.
2. When the PC is not binding,   ~() and  = 0: Then, ! = , and c = c (), p = p(),
and ! = !() are determined by (36), (34), and (35), respectively. The solution is history
dependent. Equation (35) and R = 1 imply that
u0 (c ())

P (! ())  P ()+ [! ()  ] =  1X 0 (p ()) ;
namely, the planner requires constant e¤ort over the set of states for which the constraint is not
binding: p = p (). Di¤erentiating the left-hand side yields
u00 (c ()) c0 ()  P (! ())  P ()| {z }
<0
+

u0 (c ())P 0 () + 1
  
!0 ()  1
= u00 (c ()) c0 ()   P (! ())  P () < 0
since, recall, (36) implies that P 0 () =  1=u0 (c ()). This implies that the right-hand side must
also be decreasing in . Since X is convex and increasing, this implies in turn that p () must
be decreasing in . Moreover, P 0 () =  1=u0 (c ()), implies that c () must be increasing in ,
while P 0 () = P 0 (!()) shows that also !() is increasing in .
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 11. This proof builds on the proof of Lemma 5 and Proposition 10. We
already know that in the case  < ! the IC is potentially binding.
1. When the IC is not binding,  = 0, the solution (c; p; !; !) is as described in Proposition
10.
2. When the IC and the PC is binding,  > 0 and ,  > 0, then p = p
; ! = !; ! = ! as
described in Lemma 5. Consumption varies with the realization of  and is determined by the
binding PC and IC in Equations (32) and (33) which imply Equation (38) in the proposition.
3. When the IC is binding and the PC is not binding,  > 0 and ,  = 0, then p = p
; ! =
!; ! = ! as described in Lemma 5. Consumption is constant across  and determined by
the binding promise-keeping constraint in (31). Alternatively, at the threshold realization ~(),
consumption must be the same as in Equation (38) which implies Equation (39).
Finally, we guess and verify that the threshold realization of  where the IC starts binding is given
by  = ~(!)  ~(). Consider the promise-keeping constraint when the current promised utility is
 = !:
! =
Z 
0

u(c) X(p) + 

(1  p)! + p!

dF ()
+
Z max

h
u(c) + dev
i
dF ()
=
Z 
0
[W (0; w)  ] dF () + (W (0; w)  ) [1  F ()]
= W (0; w) 
Z 
0
dF ()   [1  F ()] :
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The comparison with the threshold function in (37) conrms the guess that  = ~(!).
Proof of Proposition 12. The planner solves (30) subject to (31), (32), and (40). We write the
Lagrangian,
 =
Z
@

w   c +R 1
  
1 (!   !)

P
 
!

+ (!   !) P (!)

dF ()
+
Z
@
 
u (c) X
 
(!   !)

+ 
  
1 (!   !)

! + (!   !)!

dF ()  

+
Z
@

 
u
 
c
 X  (!   !)+    1 (!   !)! + (!   !)! W (0; w) +  d;
where  and  denote the multipliers in recession. The rst-order conditions with respect to c, !,
and ! yield
0 =  f() + f() + u0(c);
0 = R 1

(!   !) P 0 (!) + 0(!   !)

P (!)  P
 
!

f()
+

f() + 
   X 0((!   !))0(!   !)
+

(!   !)1 + 0(!   !)

!   !
  
0 = R 1
 
1 (!   !)

P 0
 
!

+ 0(!   !)( 1)

P (!)  P
 
!

f()
+

f() + 
   X 0((!   !))0(!   !)( 1)
+
 
1 (!   !)

1 + 0(!   !)( 1)

!   !
  :
Moreover, the rst-order condition for reform e¤ort reads
X 0((!   !))  (!   !) = 0
and the envelope condition is given by
P 0 () =  :
Combining the rst-order conditions and the envelope condition yields
1
u0(c)
=  P 0 () + 
f()
(69)
R
1
u0(c)
=  

P 0 (!) +
0(!   !)
(!   !)

P (!)  P
 
!

(70)
R
1
u0(c)
=  

P 0
 
!
  0(!   !)
1 (!   !)

P (!)  P
 
!

: (71)
Given that R = 1, Equations (70) and (71) imply that (41) and (42) must hold for any realized
default cost state .
For all states  where the participation constraint is not binding,  = 0, the rst-order condition
in (69) satises
1
u0(c)
=  P 0 () : (72)
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In that case, the solution is history dependent, c = c(), ! = !(), ! = !() and determined
by (69), (41) and (42). For all states where the participation constraint is binding,  > 0, the
participation constraint holds
u
 
c
 X  (!   !)+   1 (!   !)!+(!   !)!

= W (0; w)  :
In that case, the solution c, !, ! is independent of  and determined by the binding PC in (32),
(41), and (42).
Finally, note that the threshold realization of  where the constraint starts binding, ~(), remains
determined by the binding promise-keeping constraint
 =
Z ~()
0
[W (0; w)  ] dF () +
Z max
~()

u (c()) X ((!()  !()))
+ ((1 (!()  !()))!() + (!()  !())!())

dF ()
= W (0; w) 
"Z ~()
0
dF () +
h
1  F (~())
i
~()
#
:
Thus,  = 0,   ~() and  > 0,  < ~(). This concludes the proof of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 13. We prove the proposition by deriving a contradiction. To this aim,
suppose that, for  (b) = P () ; the planner can deliver more utility to the agent than can the market
equilibrium. Namely,  > EV (b; w). Then, since P is a decreasing strictly concave function, we must
have that P (EV (b; w)) > P () and P 0 (EV (b; w)) > P 0 () :We show that this inequality, along with
the set of optimality conditions, induces a contradiction.
First, recall, that Equation (6) implies that  (b) = RQ (b; w) b: Thus,
P (EV (b; w)) > P () = RQ (b; w) b; (73)
where EV (b; w) is decreasing in b. Di¤erentiating the two sides of the inequality (73) with respect to
b yields
P 0 (EV (b; w)) d
db
EV (b; w) >
d
db
[Q (b; w) b]R = 1  F   (b) ; (74)
where the right-hand side equality follows from the proof of Lemma 2. Next, Equation (49) implies
that
d
db
EV (b; w) =   1  F   (b) u0 [C (b; w)] ;
where C (b; w) = Q (B (b; w) ; w)B (b; w) + w  b is the consumption level in the market equilibrium
when the debt b is honored. Plugging the expression of ddbEV (b; w) into (74), and simplifying terms,
yields
u0 (C (b; w)) >   1P 0 (EV (b; w)) : (75)
Next, note that C (b; w) = c () : Equation (75) yields u0 (c ()) >  1= P 0 (EV (b; w)) ; while (61)
yields that u0 (c ()) =  1= P 0 () : Thus, the two conditions jointly imply that P 0 () > P 0 (EV (b; w))
which in turn implies that  < EV (b; w), since P is decreasing and concave. This contradicts the
assumption that  > EV (b; w) :
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The analysis thus far implies that   EV (b; w) :We can also rule out that  < EV (b; w), because
it would contradict that the allocation chosen by the planner is constrained e¢ cient. Therefore,
 = EV (b; w) :
Proof of Proposition 14. The strategy of the proof is the same as that of Proposition 13. In
particular, we prove that, if p = p (EV (b; w)) ; i.e., e¤ort is set at the constrained optimum level, then
 (b) = P (),  = EV (b; w), where  (b) is the valuation of debt conditional on staying in recession
before the realization of : We prove this by deriving a contradiction. To this aim, suppose that, for
 (b) = P () ; the planner can deliver more utility than the agent gets in the market equilibrium.
Namely,  > EV (b; w). Then, since P is a decreasing strictly concave function, we must have that
P (EV (b; w)) > P () and P 0 (EV (b; w)) > P 0 () : Note that, absent moral hazard, the price of
recession-contingent debt is independent of the amount of recovery-contingent debt. It is therefore
legitimate to dene ~Qw
 
b0w
  Qw  b0w; b0w :
First, the same argument invoked in the proof of Proposition 13 implies that  (b) = R1 p ~Qw (b) b:
Hence,
P (EV (b; w)) > P () =
R
1  p
~Qw (b) b: (76)
where EV (b; w) is decreasing in b. Di¤erentiating the two sides of the inequality (76) with respect to
b yields:
P 0 (EV (b; w)) d
db
EV (b; w) (77)
>
R
1  p
d
db

~Qw (b) b

=   [1  F ( (b))] ;
where the right-hand side equality follows from Equation (55). Next, Equation (54) implies that
d
db
EV (b; w) =   [1  F ( (b))] u0 (C (b; w)) ;
where C (b; w) is the consumption level assuming that the recession-contingent debt b is honored.
Plugging in the expression of ddbEV (b; w) allows us to simplify (77) as follows:
u0 (C (b; w)) >   1
P 0 (EV (b; w))
: (78)
Next, note that C (b; w) = c (). Equation (78) yields u0 (c ()) >   1
P 0(EV (b;w)) ; while (72) yields
that u0 (c ()) =   1
P 0() : Thus, the two conditions jointly imply that   1P 0() >   1P 0(EV (b;w)) which in
turn implies that  < EV (b; w), since P is decreasing and concave. This contradicts the assumption
that  > EV (b; w) :
The analysis thus far establishes that   EV (b; w) : We can also rule out that  < EV (b; w) be-
cause it would contradict that the allocation chosen by the planner is constrained e¢ cient. Therefore,
 = EV (b; w).
Proof of Proposition 15. We have already shown in Proposition 13 that the market equilibrium
is equivalent to the planner solution once the economy has entered the absorbing normal time state.
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Thus, we can limit the proof to the recession state. The strategy of the proof is to show that the
rst-order conditions of the planner problem and the market equilibrium are equivalent. Under our
assumption that the rst-order conditions of the planner problem are necessary and su¢ cient for the
characterization of the optimal contract, this proves that the market equilibrium decentralizes the
planner solution.
Let the solution of an interior state-contingent Markov equilibrium be denoted by the collection
of functions
EV (b; w); C(; w);	(; ); B w(; w); Bw(; w):
This solution necessarily satises the budget constraint in (17) and the necessary optimality conditions
for reform e¤ort and debt issuance in Equations (19), (22), and (23). We show in the following that an
interior solution to the planner problem satises these optimality conditions and the budget constraint.
Formally, we guess and verify that
EV (b; w) = 
C(b)  C(B(b; ; w); w) = c()
	(b)  	(Bw(B(b; ; w); w); B w(B(b; ; w); w)) = p()
B(B w(b; w); 0; w) = Q(B w(B(B w(b; w); 0; w); w)) + w   c0(!())
B(b; ; w) = 	(b)Q w(B w(B(b; ; w); ; w); w))
+(1 	(b))Qw(Bw(B(b; 0; w); w)) + w   C(b);
can be implemented as a market equilibrium, given that the optimal contract yields zero prots in
expectation to the planner
P () =
 
(1  F ( (b))) b+
Z (b)
0
 
 1 () dF ()
!
  (b) :
Note that the zero prot condition in combination with the guess EV (b; w) =  implies that there
must also be zero expected prots in the continuation
P (!()) =  (B w(B(b; ; w))
P (!()) = 
 
Bw(B(b; ; w); w)

;
and that the continuation values are given by
EV (B w(B(b; ; w); w); w) = !()
EV (Bw(B(b; ; w); w); w) = !():
By construction of the above solution candidate for the Markov equilibrium, the sovereign budget
constraint in (17) and the optimality condition for reform e¤ort in (19) are satised. Moreover, in the
planner solution the agent is exactly indi¤erent of staying in the contract when
u(c()) X(p())
+
 
p()!() + (1  p())!()
  = W (0; w)  .
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This coincides with the indi¤erence to renegotiate in the market equilibrium as24 u(C(b)) X(	(b))
+

	(b)EV (B w(B(b; ; w); w); w)
+(1 	(b))EV (Bw(B(b; ; w); w); w)
 35 = W (B(b; ; w); w)
= W (0; w)  ;
where the last equality follows from the indi¤erence assumption. Thus, the threshold function of the
planner solution coincides with the threshold function of the market equilibrium, ~() = (b). As a
consequence, the sovereign receives a value of W (0; w)  , for the same set of states - in the optimal
contract and in the Markov equilibrium.
To show the equivalence of the dynamic optimality conditions, let us rst simplify the notation
by dening b0w; = B w(B(b; ; w); w) and b
0
w; = Bw(B(b; ; w); w). The zero prot condition has two
important implications:
1. The di¤erence in prots across future states for the planner corresponds to the di¤erence in the
recovery values of the issued debt for the international investors
R(b0w;; b0w;) =

P (!())  P
 
!()

;
where (b0w;; b
0
w;) is dened in Equation (24) of Proposition (8) of the market equilibrium with
GDP-linked debt.
2. The derivative of the promised utility with respect to the debt level is given by
d!()
db0w;
=
1  F



b0w;

P 0
 
!()
 ;
such that the derivative of the reform e¤ort function in the market equilibrium can be written
as
@	(b0w;; b
0
w;)
@b0w;
=  0(!()  !())( 1)
d!()
db w;
=  0(!()  !())
1  F



b0w;

P 0
 
!()
 :
Thus, the intertemporal optimality conditions of the optimal contract in Equations (70) and (71)
can be written as
R
1
u0(c())
=  
264 P 0 (!()) + @	(b0w;; b0w;)
@b0w
0@1  F



b0w;

P 0 (!())
1A 1 R(b0w;; b0w;)
	(b0w;; b
0
w;)
375
R
1
u0(c())
=  
264P 0  !()+ @	(b0w;; b0w;)@b0w;
0@1  F



b0w;

P 0
 
!()

1A 1 R	(b0w;; b0w;)
1 	(b0w;; b0w;)

375 :
XIX
We have shown in Proposition (11) that in all future states 0  (b0w;) where the participation
constraint is not binding, the optimal contract satises the optimality condition
 P 0  !() = 1u0(c0(!()))
=
1
u0(C0(b0w;; w))
; 0  (b0w;);
such that the conditional Euler Equations of the Markov equilibrium in (22) and (23) are indeed
satised
R
u0( C0(b0w;))
u0(C(b))
= 1 +
@	(b0w;; b
0
w;)
@b0w
R(b0w;; b0w;)
	(b0w;; b
0
w;)

1  F



b0w;

R
u0(C0(b0w;))
u0(C(b))
=
241 + @	(b0w;; b0w;)
@b0w;
R(b0w;; b0w;)
1 	(b0w;; b0w;)

1  F



b0w;

35 ;
for 0  (b0w;).
Finally, we verify the guess that the optimal solution to the planner problem yields the value  in
the Markov equilibrium by solving the functional equation
EV (b; w) =
Z
@
24 u(C(b)) X(	(b))
+

	(b)EV (B w(B(b; ; w); w); w)
+(1 	(b))EV (Bw(B(b; ; w); w); w)
 35 dF ()
=
Z
@

u
 
c()
 X(p()) +  p()!() + (1  p())!() dF ()
= ;
where the last equality follows from the binding promise-keeping constraint of the planner problem.
This conrms the initial guess that EV (b; w) = . Thus, if the optimality conditions of the planner
problem are necessary and su¢ cient to characterize the optimal solution, then the Markov equilibrium
with GDP-linked debt and the solution to the planner problem must be equivalent.
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B Appendix B: Additional technical analysis
This appendix contains additional technical analysis. In particular, it provides: (i) technical details
that complete the proof of Proposition 4 in Appendix A; (ii) technical details of the analysis in Section
4; (iii) an extension involving learning; (iv) the numerical algorithm used in Section 5; (v) an exact
decomposition of the welfare e¤ect (into a level e¤ect, a volatility e¤ect, and a discounting e¤ect) of
going from a stationary allocation to the rst best; and (vi) some additional gures.
B.1 Details of the proof of Proposition 4
This section completes the proof of Proposition 4 in Appendix A. We have established above that an
interior solution necessarily satises the FOC
1  F ((B(b; w)))u0(Q(B(b; w); w)B(b; w)  b+ w)
=

1  F ((B(b; w)))u0(Q(B(B(b; w); w))B(B(b; w); w) B(b; w) + w):
Both, constant debt accumulation, B(b; w) = b and maximal debt accumulation B(b; w) = b are
obvious solution candidates. Note however, that B(b; w) = b can only be a global maximum when
the outstanding debt level is at the maximum, b = b (where the two solution candidates coincide),
because otherwise the objective is strictly falling in the left neigborhood of b since
u0(Q(b; w)b  b+ w) < u0(Q(b; w)b  b+ w); b < b:
Thus, we are therefore left to show that B(b; w) = b is the unique solution that satises the FOC. For
the ease of exposition, let us rewrite the FOC as
1  F ((b0))u0(Q(b0; w)b0   b+ w)
=

1  F ((b0))u0(Q(b00; w)b00   b0 + w):
Suppose there existed a solution candidate where the current debt accumulation b0 was strictly reduced,
b   b0 > 0. Because the marginal bond revenue is falling and smaller than R 1 this leads to a
smaller reduction of todays consumption relative the increase in next periods consumption for a
given b00. Therefore, b00 has to be lowered even further to equalize consumption intertemporally,
b0   b00 > b   b0 > 0. This argument can be expanded to further periods such that the equilibrium
would feature accelerated asset accumulation and ever falling consumption which contradicts the
requirement that it is a global maximum. Suppose to the contrary that current debt accumulation
b0 was strictly increased, b0   b > 0. Then, by the same argument as before, b00 has to be increased
even further to equalize consumption intertemporally, b00   b0 > b0   b > 0, and the equilibrium would
feature accelerated debt accumulation. This implies that the economy will hit the upper bound on
debt accumulation b for some outstanding debt level below the maximum, b < b. However, we have
already shown that this cannot be optimal. Thus, B(b; w) = b is the unique maximizer of the objective
function.
B.2 Formal properties of the analysis of Section 4
Proposition 16 There exists unique prot functions P and P that solve the programs (25) and
(30), respectively. Moreover, P and P are continuously di¤erentiable and strictly concave. Given
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the promised utility  and the realization , (i) if w = w there exists a unique optimal pair of promised
utility and consumption f! () ; c ()g ; (ii) if w = w there exists a unique optimal 4-tuple of promised
utilities, consumption and e¤ort,

! () ; ! () ; p () ; c ()
	
. The rst-order conditions in Propo-
sitions 9 and 10 are necessary and su¢ cient when the solution is interior.
The proof strategy follows Thomas and Worrall (1990, Proof of Proposition 1), i.e., we show that
the problem is a contraction mapping to establish the uniqueness and strict concavity of P and P .
The di¤erentiabilty of P and P follows from an application of Lemma 1 in Benveniste and Scheinkman
(1979). Finally, we prove that P and P pin down uniquely promised utilities, e¤ort and consumption.
The arguments used to prove Proposition 16 in normal times and recession are mirror image of
each other, except that the recession case is complicated by the presence of an e¤ort choice. For
this reason, we prove the results when w = w (assuming the properties of P follow the proposition),
omitting the simpler proof for the case in which w = w (more precisely, the arguments are extended
by setting X(p) = 0 and p = 1).
We prove the results in the form of three lemmas and one corollary. We rst proof the above
Proposition for the case where the planners choice is not restricted by the incentive constraint, and
then generalize to the case with the incentive constraint.
Dene, rst, the mapping T (x)() as the right-hand side of the planners functional equation
T (x)() = max
(fc;p;!;!g2@)2()
Z
@

w   c + 

p P (!)
+(1  p)x(!)

dF ()
where maximization is constrained by the set () dened byZ
@

u(c) X(p) + 

p! + (1  p)!

dF ()  
u(c) X(p) + 

p! + (1  p)!
     ; 8 2 @;
c 2 [0; w]; p 2 [p; p]; ; ! 2 [   E [] ; ]; ! 2 [   E [] ; ]:
Recall that  = W (0; w) and  = W (0; w) are the values of the outside option during recession and
normal times, respectively. We take as given the uniqueness, strict concavity, and di¤erentiability of
the prot function in normal times, P . Moreover, let the prot in normal times be bounded between
PMIN = 0 and PMAX = w=(1  ).
Lemma 6 T (x) maps concave functions into strictly concave functions.
Proof. Let  0 6=  00 2 [   E [] ; ],  2 (0; 1), o =  0 + (1  ) 00, P k() = T (P k 1)(), and P k 1
be concave. Then,
P k 1(
0 + (1  ) 00)  P k 1( 0) + (1  )P k 1( 00):
We follow the strategy of Thomas and Worrall (1990, Proof of Proposition 1), i.e., we construct a
feasible but (weakly) suboptimal contract,
n
co; p
o
; !
o
; !
o

o
2@
, such that even the prot generated by
the suboptimal contract P ok(
0+(1 ) 00)  P k( 0+(1 ) 00) dominates the linear combination of
maximal prots P k(
0)+(1 )P k( 00). Dene the weights ;  2 (0; 1) and the 4-tuple (co; po; !o; !o)
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such that
   [1  p(
0)]
(1  p( 0)) + (1  )(1  p( 00))  
1  p( 0)
1  po(o)
  p(
0)
p( 0) + (1  )p( 00)  
p(
0)
po(
o)
!o(
o) = !(
0) + (1  )!( 00)
!o(
o) = !(
0) + (1  )!( 00)
co(
o) = u 1

u(c(
0)) + (1  )u(c( 00))

:
Hence,
(1  po(o))!o(o) = 
 
1  p( 0)

!(
0) + (1  )(1  p( 00))!( 00)
po(
o)!o(
o) = p(
0)!( 0) + (1  )p( 00)!( 00)
By construction the suboptimal allocation satises
co 2 [0; w]; p0 2 [p; p]; !o 2 [   E [] ; ]; !o 2 [   E [] ; ];
and, given the promised-utility o, is also consistent with the promise-keeping constraintZ
@

u
 
co(
o)
 X(po(o)) +  (1  po(o))!o(o) + po(o)!o(o) dF ()
=
Z
@
24 u (c( 0)) + (1  ) (c( 00)) X (p( 0) + (1  )p( 00))+ (1  p( 0))!( 0) + (1  )(1  p( 00))!( 00)
+ [p(
0)!( 0) + (1  )p( 00))!( 00)]
35 dF ()
>
Z
@
24 u (c( 0)) + (1  ) (c( 00))  [X(p( 0) + (1  )X(p( 00))]+ (1  p( 0))!( 0) + (1  )(1  p( 00))!( 00)
+ [p(
0)!( 0) + (1  )p( 00))!( 00)]
35 dF ()
=  0 + (1  ) 00 = o:
The fact that X (p( 0) + (1  )p( 00)) < X(p( 0) + (1  )X(p( 00)) follows from the convexity
of X. Moreover, the participation constraint for any  yields
u
 
co(
o)
 X(po(o)) +  (1  po(o))!o(o) + po(o)!o(o)
=
24 u (c( 0)) + (1  ) (c( 00)) X(p( 0) + (1  )p( 00))+ (1  p( 0))!( 0) + (1  )(1  p( 00))!( 00)
+ [p(
0)!( 0) + (1  )p( 00))!( 00)]
35
>
24 u (c( 0)) + (1  ) (c( 00))  [X(p( 0) + (1  )X(p( 00))]+ (1  p( 0))!( 0) + (1  )(1  p( 00))!( 00)
+ [p(
0)!( 0) + (1  )p( 00))!( 00)]
35
= 

u
 
c(
0)
 X(p( 0) + (1  p( 0))!( 0) + p( 0)!( 0)
+(1  ) c( 00) X(p( 00)) + (1  p( 00))!( 00) + p( 00))!( 00)
  (   ) + (1  ) (   ) =    ;
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where we used again the strict convexity of the cost function X. Thus, we have proven that the
suboptimal allocation
n
co; p
o
; !
o
; !
o

o
2@
is feasible. Namely, it satises the participation constraints
and delivers at least the promised utility o. The prot function evaluated at the optimal contract
c; p; !; !
	
2@ then implies the following inequality,
P k(
0) + (1  )P k( 00)
= T (P k 1)(
0) + (1  )T (P k 1)( 00)
=
Z
@
24 w   [c( 0) + (1  )c( 00)] + (1  p( 0))P k 1(!( 0)) + (1  )(1  p( 00))P k 1(!( 00))


p(
0) P (!( 0)) + (1  )p( 00) P (!( 00))

35 dF ()
=
Z
@
24 w   [c( 0) + (1  )c( 00)] +(1  po(o)) P k 1(!( 0)) + (1  )P k 1(!( 00))
po(
o)

 P (!(
0)) + (1  ) P (!( 00))

35 dF ()
<
Z
@
24 w   u 1 (u(c( 0)) + (1  )u(c( 00))) +(1  po(o))P k 1(!( 0) + (1  )!( 00))
po(
o) P (!(
0) + (1  )!( 00))
35 dF ()
=
Z
@

w   co(o) + 

po(
o) P (!o(
o)) + (1  po(o))P k 1(!o(o))

dF ()
 P ok(o)  P k(o) = P k( 0 + (1  ) 00):
The rst inequality follws from the strict concavity of the utility function and the prot function in
normal times, along with the assumed concavity of P k 1. The second inequality, P k(o)  P ok(o),
follows from the fact that the optimal allocation delivers (weakly) larger prots than the suboptimal
one. We conclude that P k(
0+(1  ) 00) > P k( 0)+(1  )P k( 00), i.e., P k is strictly concave. This
concludes the proof of the lemma.
Let 
 denote the space of continuous functions dened over the interval [ E [] ; ] and bounded
between PMIN =  ( w w)=(1  ) and PMAX = w=(1  ). Moreover, let d1 denote the supremum
norm, such that (
; d1) is a complete metric space.
Lemma 7 The mapping T (x) is an operator on the complete metric space (
; d1), T (x) is a con-
traction mapping with a unique xed-point P 2 
.
Proof. By the Theorem of the Maximum T (x)() is continuous in . Moreover, T (x)() is bounded
between PMIN and PMAX since even choosing zero consumption for any realization of  would induce
prots not exceeding PMAX
w + 
Z
@

p P (!) + (1  p)x(!)

dF () < w + =(1  ) w
= w=(1  ) = PMAX ,
and choosing the maximal consumption of w for any  would induce prots no lower than PMIN ,
 ( w   w) + 
Z
@
x(!)dF ()  PMIN :
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Thus, T (x)() is indeed an operator on (
; d1):
According to Blackwells su¢ cient conditions T is a contraction mapping (see Lucas and Stokey
(1989, Theorem 3.3) if: (i) T is monotone, (ii) T discounts.
1. Monotonicity: Let x; y 2 
 with x()  y(), 8 2 [   E [] ; ]. Then
T (x)() = max
(fc;p;!;!g2@)2()
Z
@

w   c + 

p P (!)
+(1  p)x(!)

dF ()
 max
(fc;p;!;!g2@)2()
Z
@

w   c + 

p P (!)
+(1  p)y(!)

dF ()
= T (y)():
2. Discounting: Let x 2 
 and a  be a real constant. Then
T (x+ a)() = max
(fc;p;!;!g2@)2()
Z
@

w   c + 

p P (!)
+(1  p)
 
x(!) + a
  dF ()
 T (x)() + a
< T (x)() + a;
since  < 1:
Thus, T is indeed a contraction mapping and according to Banachs xed-point theorem (see Lucas
and Stokey (1989, Theorem 3.2)) there exists a unique xed-point P 2 
 satisfying the stationary
functional equation,
P () = T (P )():
Corollary 2 The prot function P () is strictly concave in  2 [   E [] ; ].
This follows immediately from Lucas and Stokey (1989, Corollary 1). Since the unique xed-point
of T is the limit of applying the operator n times Tn(x)() starting from any (and, in particular the
concave ones) element x in 
, and the operator T maps concave into strictly concave functions the
xed-point P must be strictly concave.
Lemma 8 The prot function P () is continuously di¤erentiable in  2 [   E [] ; ].
Proof. The proof is an application of Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979, Lemma 1). Recall that P
and P are strictly concave. Consider the pseudo prot function
eP (~; )  Z ~(~)
0

w   ~c(~) + 

p() P (!()) + (1  p())P (!())

dF () (79)
+
Z 1
~(~)
h
w   ~c~(~)(~) + 

p() P (!()) + (1  p())P (!())
i
dF ()
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where the triplet (p(); !(); !()) is the same as in the optimal contract given an initial promise
, and the consumption function, ~c(~), is dened implicitly by the condition
~ =
Z ~(~)
0

u (~c(~)) X(p()) + 

(1  p())!() + p()!()

dF ()
+
Z 1
~(~)
h
u

~c~(~)(~)

 X(p()) + 

(1  p())!() + p()!()
i
dF (): (80)
Note that for ~ = , Equation (80) is equivalent to the promise-keeping constraint. Moreover, for all
states   ~(~) such that the (pseudo-)participation constraint is binding,
u (~c(~)) X(p()) + 

(1  p())!()
+p()!()

=    : (81)
Otherwise, when  > ~(~) then consumption and promised utility are history dependent, implying
that
u

~c~(~)(~)

 X(p()) + 

(1  p())!()
+p()!()

=    ~(~): (82)
Substituting in the right hand-side of (81) and (82), respectively, in the rst and second line of (80),
pins down the threshold ~ (~) that separates states in which the participation constraint is binding
from states with in which it is not binding:
~ =   
Z ~(~)
0
dF () 

1  F

~ (~)

 ~ (~) :
Di¤erentiating Equation (81) with respect to ~ shows that, for   ~(~); u0 (~c(~)) ~c0(~) = 0:
Di¤erentiating Equation (80) shows that the consumption function, ~c~(~)(~); is also continuously
di¤erentiable when  > ~(). In particular,
1 = (1  F (~()))u0

~c~(~)(~)

~c0~(~)(~): (83)
Recall that the function eP has the properties that eP (~; )  P () with eP (; ) = P (). Thus,
Lemma 1 in Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) implies that the prot function P () is continuously
di¤erentiable in  2 [   E [] ; ], with derivative
P 0() = eP ~(; ) =  (1  F (~()))~c0~()()
=  1=u0 [(c())] < 0:
The value of eP ~ follows from the di¤erentiation of (79) using standard methods. The last equality
follows from (83) and from the fact that ~c~()() = c(). This establishes that the prot function P ()
is continuously di¤erentiable, concluding the proof.
We can now establish that the constrained allocation is unique.
Lemma 9 The constrained-optimal allocation is characterized by a unique 4-tuple of state-contingent
promised utilities, consumption and e¤ort levels,

! () ; ! () ; p () ; c ()
	
.
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Proof. Lemma 6 implies that there cannot be two optimal contracts with distinct promised-utilities.
Suppose not, so that there exists a 4-tuple of promised utilities
n
!0; !
00
; !
0
; !
00

o
such that either
!0() = !
00
() or !
0
() 6= !00() (or both). Then, from the strict concavity of P and P ; it would
be possible to construct a feasible allocation that dominates the continuation prot implied by the
proposed optimal allocations, i.e., either P (!0 + (1   )!00) > P (!0) + (1   )P (!00), or P (!0 +
(1   )!00) >  P (!0) + (1   ) P (!00) (or both). This contradicts the assumption that the proposed
allocations are optimal, establishing that the optimal contract pins down a unique pair of promised
utilities,
n
!; !
0

o
:
Finally, we show that a unique pair of promised utilities pins down uniquely e¤ort and consumption.
More formally, the rst order conditions imply that
X 0 (p) = 

 P 0  ! 1   P (!)  P  !+  !   ! ;
 P 0  ! 1 = u0(c);
implying that, given  and , e¤ort and consumption are uniquely determined.
B.2.1 Incentive constraint
The proof of the prot functions strict concavity and di¤erentiability when the planner problem in-
cludes the incentive constraint for reform e¤ort provision is by-and-large a corollary of the case without
the additional incentive constraint. Moreover, we have already shown that the optimal allocation is
unique when the incentive constraint is binding.
We know from Proposition 10 that for  > ! the additional incentive constraint is never relevant,
thus strict concavity and the di¤erentiability of the prot function follows immediately from the above
analysis. On the other hand, if   !, than the prot function evaluated at the optimal contract
reads as
P () =
Z ~(!)
0

w   c + 

(1  p)P (!) + p P (!)

dF ()
+
Z ~()
~(!)

w   c + 

(1  p)P (!) + p P (!) dF ()
+
Z max
~()
h
w   c~() + 

(1  p)P (!) + p P (!)i dF ():
Note that the promised-utility  only enters the last two terms such that the rst derivative of the
prot function is given by (we will prove di¤erentiability of the prot function below)
P 0() =
h
w   c~() + 

(1  p)P (!) + p P (!)i f(~())~0()
 
Z max
~()
dc~()
d~()
~
0
()dF ()
 
h
w   c~() + 

(1  p)P (!) + p P (!)i f(~())~0()
=  
Z max
~()
dc~()
d
dF () < 0;
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where Equation (39) implies that dc~()=d =  u0(c~()) 1~
0
() > 0 as the threshold ~() is decreasing
in the promised utility. The negative second derivative follows immediately
P 00() =  
"Z max
~()
d2c~()
d2
dF () +
dc~()
d
f(~())( ~0())
#
< 0;
because
d2c~()=d
2 =
h
 u00(c~())~
0
()2 + u0(c~())
~
00
()
i

h
u0(c~())
 1~
0
()
i 2
> 0:
The positive sign of the second derivative is based on the fact that ~
00
() > 0. This can be veried
from totally di¤erentiating Equation (37) with respect to 
1 =  
h
~()f(~())~
0
()
i
 
h
~
0
()
h
1  F (~())
i
  ~()f(~())~0()
i
=  ~0()
h
1  F (~())
i
) ~0() =  
h
1  F (~())
i 1
< 0:
~
00
() =  f(~())~0()=
h
1  F (~())
i2
> 0:
Finally, as ~() is continuously di¤erentiable, so is consumption, c~(); and the prot function, P ().
This concludes the proof of Proposition 16.
B.3 Extension: learning
In this section we consider an extensions of the theory. In our theory, renegotiation is unambiguously
good for the borrower. On the one hand, consumption always increases upon renegotiation, in line with
the empirical evidence documented by Reinhart and Trebesch (2016). On the other, renegotiations
do not a¤ect the terms at which the country can borrow in future. In particular, conditional on the
debt level, the risk premium is independent of the countrys credit history. In this section, we sketch
an extension where bond prices depend on the frequency of previous renegotiations. We assume that
there is imperfect information about the distribution from which countries draw their realizations of
: In particular, there are two types of countries, creditworthy (CW) and not creditworthy (NC), that
draw from di¤erent distributions.35 In particular, FNC ()  FCW (), with strict inequality holding
for some ; implying that the NC country is more likely to have lower realizations of the default cost.
We assume that priors are common knowledge, and denote by  the belief that the borrower is CW.
Beliefs are updated according to Bayesrule:
0 =
fCW ()
fCW ()  + fNC () (1  )    (; ) :
Moreover, we dene
F (j)  FCW () + (1  )FNC () ;
35One could assume that the distributions have a common support in order to rule out perfectly revealing realizations.
However, this is not essential.
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and restrict attention to market equilibria during normal times (w = w). For the ease of exposition,
normal times variables will be indicated with a bar on top for the rest of this section.
In the new environment, the price of debt depends on the prior about the countrys type, i.e.,
Q (b0; ). No arbitrage implies the following bond price:
Q
 
b0; 

=
1
R
 
(1  F ( (b0; ) j  ( (b0; ) ; ))) +

b0
R (b0;)
0 b^ (;  (; )) dFCW () +
1 
b0
R (b0;)
0 b^ (;  (; )) dFNC ()
!
where  (b0; ) denotes the threshold 0 such that debt will be honored next period if and only if
0   (b0; ) : More formally,  is the unique xed point of the following equation
 = 
 
b0;  (; )

:
The function  takes into account that the realization of 0 will itself alter next-period beliefs, which
in turn a¤ect the countrys incentive to renegotiate.36 The bond price is falling in b0 and increasing
in :
Consider, next, the consumption-savings decision. The CEE yields (formal derivation below):
1  F     B (b; ) ;  j  (; ) =  Z 1
(b;)
u0

C
 
 
 
0; 

; B (b; )

u0

C (b; )
 dFCW  0 (84)
+ (1  )
Z 1
(b;)
u0

C
 
 
 
0; 

; B (b; )

u0

C (b; )
 dFNC  0 :
If next-period consumption conditional on honoring the debt did not depend on 0; then the CEE would
boil down to Equation (13). However, in this extension, the realized consumption growth depends on
0 because creditors learn over time about the borrowerstypes. For example, take two realization of
0; say 0h and 
0
l; such that 
0
h > 
0
l; neither inducing renegotiation. Here, consumption will be larger
under 0h because the larger realization has a stronger positive e¤ect on the belief that the country is
CW. This improves the terms of borrowing, and hence consumption. Note that renegotiation might
be associated with a fall in consumption  for example if the realized  is just below  (b0; ) the
e¤ect of a very small renegotiation is more than o¤set by that of Bayesian updating. Conversely, a
country experiencing a sequence of large s which induces it to honor debt for a long time will enjoy
an increasing consumption.
In summary, this simple extension shows that our theory can incorporate learning e¤ects through
which countries prone to renegotiation are punished by the market with high interest rates.
B.3.1 Formal derivation of Equation (84).
Let the sovereigns value functions be denoted by V (b; ; ) and W (b; ). Since outright default is
never observed in equilibrium, the value function simplies to
V (b; ; ) = max
b0[b;~b]

u
 
Q
 
b0; 
 b0 + w   B (b; ; w; )+   EV  b0; 	 : (85)
36Note that some functions must be redened to take into account their dependence on public beliefs. Apart from
Q (b0; ) ; dened in the text, b^ (; ) is the renegotiated debt given  and : Moreover,  (b0; ) denotes the threshold
that makes the country indi¤erent between honoring the debt level b0 and defaulting, conditional on the realized belief
:
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where EV (b0; )  E V  b0; 0;   0;  :
The function  is such that (b; ) = W (0; )  W (b; ). Given a debt issuance of b0 and a current
prior of ; debt will be honored next period if 0   (b0; ) where  is the unique xed point of the
following equation
 = 
 
b0;  (; )

:
The probability of renegotiation is
E

F
 

 
b0; 0
 j0 ; 	 = FCW    b0;  (; )+ (1  )FNC    b0;  (; )
= FCW
 

 
b0; 

+ (1  )FNC
 

 
b0; 

= F
 

 
b0; 

;  (; )

;
and an arbitrage argument then implies the following bond price
Q
 
b0; 

=
1
R
 
1  F ( (b0; ) j  (; )) +

b0
R (b0;)
0 b^ (;  (; )) dFCW () +
1 
b0
R (b0;)
0 b^ (;  (; )) dFNC ()
!
:
In what follows, we assume that the relevant equilibrium functions are di¤erentiable in b. Then,
di¤erentiating b Q (b; ), with respect to b yields
d
db

b Q (b; )	 = Q (b; ) + b d
db
Q
 
b0; 

= Q (b; )  b
R

@F ( (b; ) j  (; ))
@
@ (b; )
@b

+
+
b
R

b
b^ ( (b; ) ;  ( (b; ) ; )) fCW ( (b; ))
@ (b; )
@b
  1
R

b
Z (b;)
0
b^ (;  (; )) dFCW ()
+
b
R
1  
b
b^ ( (b; ) ;  ( (b; ) ; )) fNC ( (b; ))
@ (b; )
@b
  1
R
1  
b
Z (b;)
0
b^ (;  (; )) dFNC () ;
such that
d
db

b Q (b; )	 = Q (b; )  b
R

@F ( (b; ) j  (; ))
@
@ (b; )
@b

| {z }
A+B
+
+
b
R
fCW (
 (b; ))
@ (b; )
@b| {z }
A
+ (1  ) b
R
fNC (
 (b; ))
@ (b; )
@b| {z }
B
  Q (b; ) + 1
R
(1  F ( (b; ) j  (; )))
=
1
R
(1  F ( (b; ) j  (; ))) :
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Next, consider the consumption-savings decision. The rst-order condition of (85) reads
d
db0

Q
 
b0; 

b0
	 u0  Q  b0;  b0 + w   B (b; ; w; )+ d
db0
EV
 
b0; 

= 0:
The value function has a kink at b = b^ (; ) : Consider, rst, the range where b < b^ (; ) :
Di¤erentiating the value function yields
d
db
V (b; ; ) =  u0  Q   B (b; ) ;  B (b; ) + w   b ;
where B denotes the optimal issuance of new bonds. Next, consider the region of renegotiation,
b > b^ (; ) : In this case, ddb
V (b; ; ) = 0.
Using the results above one obtains
d
db
EV (b;  (; )) = 
Z
@
d
db
V (b; ;  (; )) dFCW () + (1  )
Z
@
d
db
V (b; ;  (; )) dFNC ()
= 
 R (b;)
0
d
db
V (b; ;  (; )) dFCW ()
+
R1
(b;)
d
db
V (b; ;  (; )) dFCW ()
!
+ (1  )
 R (b;)
0
d
db
V (b; ;  (; )) dFNC ()
+
R1
(b;)
d
db
V (b; ;  (; )) dFNC ()
!
= 
Z 1
(b;)
d
db
V (b; ;  (; )) dFCW ()
+ (1  )
Z 1
(b;)
d
db
V (b; ;  (; )) dFNC ()
=
Z 1
(b;)
d
db
V (b; ;  (; )) dF (j)
=  
Z 1
(b;)
u0

Q
 
B (b;  (; )) ;  (; )
 B (b;  (; )) + w   b dF (j) :
Plugging this expression back into the FOC, and leading the expression by one period, yields
0 =
1
R
 
1  F    b0;  j  (; ) u0  Q  b0;  b0 + w   B (b; ; w; )
 
Z 1
(b;)
u0

Q
 
B
 
b0;  (; )

;  (; )
 B  b0;  (; )+ w   b dF (j)
thus
R =
 
1  F    b0;  j  (; ) Z 1
(b;)
u0

C
 
  (; ) ; B (b; )

u0

C (; b)
 dF (j)! 1 ;
where the rst step uses the fact that ddb0

Q (b0; ) b0
	
= 1R (1  F ( (b0; ) j  (; ))) ; as shown
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above. Since R = 1; then
1  F     B (b; ) ;  j  (; )
=
 Z 1
(b;)
u0

C
 
  (; ) ; B (b; )

u0

C (; b)
 dF (j)!
= 
Z 1
(b;)
u0

C
 
  (; ) ; B (b; )

u0

C (; b)
 dFCW () + (1  ) Z 1
(b;)
u0

C
 
  (; ) ; B (b; )

u0

C (; b)
 dFNC () :
B.4 Numerical algorithm
In this section, we discuss the numerical algorithms used in Section 5.
B.4.1 Market equilibrium
We solve for the market equilibrium described in Section 3 with an augmented value function iteration
algorithm. Let b = (b1; b2; :::; bN ) denote the equally spaced and inreasingly ordered grid for sovereign
debt. Let  = (1; 2; :::S) be the increasingly ordered grid for the default cost, where the location of
any grid point, s, is chosen such that the cumulative weighted sum, eF (s) Psk=1 1=S, approximates
the CDF of the default cost shock F (s). We choose N = 5
0000 and S = 600 to get a solution with
high accuracy.37
1. Guess the default threshold, 0(b; w) 2 , for both aggregate states w and guess the reform
e¤ort, 	0(b), over the debt grid b. Compute the associated bond revenue,
Q0(b; w)b = Q^0(b; w)b
Q0(b; w)b = 	0(b)Q^0(b; w)b+ (1 	0(b))Q^0(b; w)b;
where the discounted recovery values are given by
Q^0(b; w)b = R
 1
0@(1  eF (0(b; w)))b+ X
s21;:::;0(b;w)
b^0(s; w)=S
1A
and b^0(;w) 2 b is the inverse function of 0(b; w).
2. Guess the value functions conditional on honoring the debt, W0;0(b; w). For any given debt level,
bn  b^0(S ; w), on the debt grid update the value function in normal times according to
Wi+1;0(bn; w) = max
b02(b1;:::;b^0(S ; w))
u
 
Q0(b
0; w)b0 + w   bn

+
24(1  eF (0(b0; w)))Wi;0(b0; w) + X
s21;:::;0(b0; w)
Wi;0

b^0(s; w); w

=S
35 ;
37We use the conditional Euler equations of the market equilibrium to evaluate the accuracy of the solution in terms
of market consumption. The mean Euler equation error across all states is 6:7  10 4. Thus, there is a $6:7 error on
average for each $100000. Note that we approximate and evaluate the accuracy of the solution globally over the full debt
grid. Moreover, the conditional Euler equation in recession involves the derivative of an equilibrium function (reform
e¤ort) and non-smooth debt accumulation. Thus, we consider the accuracy of the solution to be high. When increasing
the number of grid points to N = 100000 and S = 10000, the mean Euler equation error can be further reduced to
2:0 10 4 at the usual cost of computational time.
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until convergence. For the remaining grid points, bn  b^0(S ; w), setWi+1;0(bn; w) = Wi+1;0(b^0(S ; w); w).
In recession, for any given debt level, bn  b^0(S ; w), on the debt grid, update the value function
according to
Wi+1;0(bn; w) = max
b02(b1;:::;b^0(S ; w))
u
 
Q0(b
0; w)b0 + w   bn

+
 
1 	0(b0)
 " (1  eF (0(b0; w)))Wi;0(b0; w)
+
P
s21;:::;0(b0;w)Wi;0

b^0(s; w); w

=S
#
+	0(b
0)
"
(1  eF (0(b0; w)))W1;0(b0; w)
+
P
s21;:::;0(b0; w)W1;0

b^0(s; w); w

=S
#
;
until convergence. For the remaining grid points, bn  b^0(S ; w), setWi+1;0(bn; w) = Wi+1;0(b^0(S ; w); w).
W1;0(b0; w) denotes the converged value function conditional on the guess for the threshold and
the reform e¤ort.
3. Update the default threshold and the reform e¤ort according to
j+1(b; w) = W1;j (0; w) W1;j (b; w) ;
and Equation (14). Go back to step 1 and iterate until convergence.
B.4.2 Optimal contract with one-sided commitment
We solve for the second-best allocation with an augmented function iteration algorithm. Consider the
same grid  = (1; 2; :::S) for the default cost that we used above. Let w = (w(1); :::; w(S))
denote the grid for promised utility, where
 w(s) =   
sX
k=1
k=S   s

1  eF (s)
w(s) =   
sX
k=1
k=S   s

1  eF (s) :
Note that given a promised utility, w(s), the default cost realization s = ~(w(s)) corresponds
to the state s where the participation constraint of the debtor starts binding. It turns out to be
convenient to set the promised utility for a continued recession, ! w =  w, and the promised utility for
a continued recession, !w = w.
1. Guess the reform e¤ort, pw;0(w), over the grid w.
2. Guess the future consumption, c0w;0;0(w), and the promised utilitiy, !w;0;0(w), over the grids
 w and w.
3. Compute current consumption from the Euler Equations (which holds for all states s where the
participation constraint is not strictly binding)
cw;0;0(w) =
 
u0
 1 
u0
 
c0w;0;0(w)

R

;
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and the initial promised utility, ~w;0 (w), implicitly dened by
   ~(~ w;0;0 ( w)) = u(c w;0;0( w)) +  w
   ~(~w;0;0
 
w

) = u(cw;0;0(w)) X(pw;0(w)) + 

pw;0(w)!w;0;0(w) + (1  pw;0(w))w

;
4. Update the guess for the future consumption function by interpolating w on the pairs (~w;0;0; cw;0;0)
to yield c0w;1;0(w) Update the guess for promised utility by interpolating c0w;1;0(w) on the pairs 
cw;0;0; ~w;0;0

to yield !w;1;0(w). Go back to step 3 and iterate until convergence. Let cw;1;0(w)
and !w;1;0(w) denote the converged functions given the guess on the reform e¤ort.
5. Guess the prot functions, P0( w) and P 0(w). Update the prot function in normal times
according to
Pi+1;0(~ w;1;0 ( w)) =

1  eF (~(~ w;1;0 ( w)))  w   c w;1;0( w) +R 1 Pi;0( w)
+
X
s21;:::;~(~ w;1;0( w))

w   c w;1;0( w(s)) +R 1 Pi;0( w(s))

=S;
until convergence, P1;0( w). In recession, update according to
P i+1;0(~w;1;0
 
w

) =

1  eF (~(~w;1;0  w))
24 w   cw;1;0(w)
+R 1

pw;0(w) Pi;0(!w;1;0(w))
+(1  pw;0(w))P i;0(w)
 35
+
X
s21;:::;~(~w;1;0(w))
24 w   cw;1;0(w(s))
+R 1

pw;0(w(s) Pi;0(!w;1;0(w(s)))
+(1  pw;0(w(s)))P i;0(w(s))
 35 =S:
6. Update the reform e¤ort function according to
pw;j+1(w) =
 
X 0
 1  u0(cw;1;j(w))R 1   P1;j(!w;1;j(w))  P1;j(w)
+
 
!w;1;j(w)  w
  :
Go back to step 3 and iterate until convergence.
B.5 An exact decomposition of welfare e¤ects
This section illustrates a case when the welfare gain decomposition proposed in section 5.4.1 is exact.
Namely, that the welfare e¤ect of going from a stationary competitive equilibrium allocation to the
rst best can be decomposed into a level e¤ect, a volatility e¤ect, and a discounting e¤ect.
For simplicity, we abstract from reform e¤ort and default costs and assume that consumption
in the competitive equilibrium is log normal with ln (c)  N  ln   Cce  v2 ; v. Thus, the average
consumption is Cce and the variance of ln (c) is v. Since c is log normal, the expected utility is
V =
1X
t=0
tE
(ct)
1 
1   =
(
1
1 
1
1  
 
Cce
1 
exp
 
 (   1) v2

for  6= 1
1
1 
 
ln
 
Cce
  v2 for  = 1:
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Calculate now the discounted utility of a rst best allocation where the present value of consump-
tion is R= (R  1)  CFB. The optimal consumption sequence is given by
ct = (R)
t
 c0:
Calculating the present value of consumption yields an expression for c0,
R
R  1 
CFB =
1X
t=0
ct
Rt
=
1X
t=0
(R)
t
 c0
Rt
= c0
1X
t=0

(R)
1
 R 1
t
=
c0
1  (R) 1 R 1
)
c0 =

1  (R) 1 R 1
 R
R  1 
CFB:
When  6= 1 the discounted utility is
VFB =
1X
t=0
t
 
cFBt
1 
1   =

1  (R) 1 R 1
1 
1   (R) 1 

R
R  1
1    CFB1 
1   ;
and in the log case ( = 1),
VFB =
1X
t=0
t ln
 
cFBt

=
1
1   ln
 
CFB

+
1
1   ln

(1  ) R
R  1

+ ln (R)

(1  )2 :
Calculate the welfare gain  of going from the competitive equilibrium V to the rst best VFB in
the log case
E
1X
t=0
t ln (ct) =
1X
t=0
t ln
 
(1 + ) cFBt

)
The welfare gain  can then be decomposed as follows,
ln (1 + ) =   ln

(1  )R
R  1

  ln (R) 
(1  )| {z }
Discounting e¤ect
 v
2|{z}
Volatility e¤ect
+ ln
 
CFB
  ln   Cce| {z }
Level e¤ect
Finally, calculate the welfare gain  of going from the competitive equilibrium V to the rst best
VFB in the case with  6= 1:
E
1X
t=0
t
(ct)
1 
1   = E
1X
t=0
t
 
(1 + ) cFBt
1 
1  
)
1
1   exp

 (   1) v
2
  
Cce
1 
= (1 + )1 

1  (R) 1 R 1
1 
1   (R) 1 

R
R  1
1   
CFB
1 
XXXV
which implies that the welfare gain  can be decomposed as follows,
ln (1 + )
=
1
1   ln
 
1   (R) 1 
1  
!
  ln

1  (R) 1 R 1
 R
R  1

| {z }
Discounting e¤ect
   v
2| {z }
Volatility e¤ect
+ log
 
CFB
  log   Cce| {z }
Level e¤ect
:
B.6 Additional gures
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Figure 7: Comparison of threshold functions in normal times and recession between the competitive
equilibrium of Section 3 (market) and the no-renegotiation equilibrium analyzed in Section 5.5.
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Figure 8: Panel a plots the expected prots (net of the initial debt value) for the lenders when ruling
out renegotiation, where the debt is adjusted so as to keep the sovereign indi¤erent between this
alternative economy and remaining in the benchmark economy. Panel b plots the equivalent expected
prots when imposing an Austerity cum Grexit policy, relative to remaining in the benchmark
economy. Negative prots are equivalent to a welfare loss.
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